THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*
A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

English Modernism and a New Theology.

The Outlook (of February 6th, 13th, 20th and 27th) publishes a valuable series of four articles by the Rev. J. C. Hardwick on 'The Modernist Position.' The first three sketch in luminous outline the causes which have produced Modernism. The writer takes considerable pains to show that Modernism is Humanist rather than Protestant in its *ethos*. This is undoubtedly the case. On the other hand, he does not, we venture to think, bring out sufficiently clearly the large Humanist element that there was in the English Reformation. The English Reformation approached nearer to the Humanist ideal than did the Reformation in any other European country. It is true, to use Mr. Birrell's phrase, that it was 'barbarously conducted'; it is equally true that a spirit of 'insatiable avarice' characterized some of its promoters; but its most influential leaders, such as John Colet, Archbishop Cranmer, Queen Elizabeth, and Richard Hooker, possessed a deep spirit of reverence for intellectual light and also for the noble and beautiful things which the past had bequeathed. The English Reformers were iconoclasts, but they were not vandals. The English Modernist, by reason of the fact that he is a Humanist, is a true son of the English Reformation. Canterbury is built on the united foundations of Jerusalem and Athens, not on either those of Rome or Geneva.

In his fourth article Mr. Hardwick deals with the very interesting and important question as to whether the Christian

religion in that new intellectual environment which has been created for it by the Renaissance of the ninteenth and twentieth centuries, and which has shattered its traditional theology, is capable of creating for itself a new theology in harmony with its new intellectual environment. His verdict is that the difficulties in the way of creating such a new theology are enormous, and that, even if created, it would at the rate at which we are moving soon be out of date. No time, he believes, could be less opportune for such an undertaking, seeing that there exists no generally accepted metaphysical system in relation to which that new theology, to be influential, would have to be created. Plato and Aristotle are no longer all-powerful as metaphysicians; Kant and Hegel have ceased to grip; modern philosophy has been content to become merely advanced physics, advanced biology, or advanced psychology. This leads our Modernist Qoheleth to conclude that:

> 'We are living in times as unsuitable for the manufacture of new dogmatic systems as for the retention of old ones.'

The future, we are warned, is indeed dark and lowering:

> 'Europe may relapse into barbarism before America has had time to emerge from it.'

The epigram is a choice one, but it does not represent the situation truly. What the Continent may do in reference to civilization we cannot say. Its record of recent years has not been good; but for England and America we need have no serious fears. Most Englishmen and Americans, owing to their distrust of logic and their inability to be deeply moved by metaphysic, feel but little need for a theology. What they feel they need is a religion and a code of conduct. If therefore our dogmatists would not persist in taking down the ark of traditional theology to do battle with the Philistines, and above all would not cry out 'Ichabod' when it is captured, we could as a nation do fairly well with a somewhat vague and ill-defined theology such as suits this age of transition. There are vast multitudes of Englishmen who believe in and obey the British Constitution although they know nothing of its theory; and so with a national Church, provided its representatives are intelligent, moral men who can show valuable educational and philanthropic results as the outcome of their activities, the nature and adequacy of their theology would not be likely to be challenged. It is the insist-

ence upon the acceptance in every particular of a clear-cut theology of ancient pattern which is helping to cause so much scepticism and unrest.

What the Modernist claims as essential for the Church as a teaching body to-day is not a new theological system, but freedom to re-interpret the traditional theology and to regard the great axioms of the Christian Faith not as demonstrated propositions, but as working hypotheses. He desires to be freed as a Christian teacher from the obligation to accept or to teach things as fundamentally true which are discredited or rendered highly uncertain by scientific and historic research. Faith he regards as a spirit of adventure; and as for Truth, he believes it to be trumps, and that it is his duty to stand by it and for it in the interests of humanity. Humanity, he is sure, cannot be really and permanently helped except by the truth, and it is only the truth in Christianity which is worth preserving; what is not true in it had certainly better be discarded. The utterance of such robust and optimistic convictions by the unsophisticated and bourgeois type of Modernist provokes Mr. Hardwick to comment somewhat pessimistically as follows:

> 'It is no doubt the case that "truth will prevail," but it prevails only with the intelligent and civilized, and these are at present, and are likely to remain, in a minority.'

But is it not also the case, notwithstanding our professed belief in democracy, that it is the minorities which lead and govern humanity? Nature gives the victory to quality, not to quantity; instead of counting votes she weighs them in a most undemocratic fashion.

Clerical Agitation and Usurpation.

The following document, dated February, 1926, and signed by two clergymen of the Southwell diocese, is being widely circulated among the English clergy:

> On December 15th of last year, moved, as I trust by Conscience, I called a Meeting of Clergy and Lay Members of the Diocesan Conference, to consider the conditions under which our Bishop would be appointed, the See being vacant; and I pleaded with those present that the Crown had no rights in the Realm of the Soul, that freedom in Religion *in Spiritual Matters* was vital; and that therefore we Clergy and Laity must claim the right to elect our own Bishop, subject of course to the approval of the Bishops expressed in Convocation.

> The Meeting, presided over by Canon d'Arcy of this Diocese, heartily approved these sentiments, and resolved—(1) That a Form of Resolution be sent to all the Clergy and Lay Members of the Diocesan Conference in the Diocese, to the effect that 'The Bishop should be elected by the Presbyters of the Diocese, subject to the approval' (I think 'with the assent' would be better) 'of the Lay Members of the Diocesan Conference' (I would prefer 'of the Laity'). (2) That they be invited to sign it; and (3) That copies of the Resolution, so signed, be forwarded to the Primate and to the Prime Minister. This was done. The Resolution received the signatures of eighty-five Clergy, and of fifty-four Lay Members of the Diocesan Conference; and was forwarded to the Primate and to the Premier as directed.
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> An intimation has since been received (1) From the Primate—'*I note with care the Resolutions carried at your Meeting . .. '*; (2) and from the Prime Minister, that '*He will, in due course, proceed to select a name for submission to His Majesty for the vacant See of Southwell, in accordance with constitutional practice.*'
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> It seems to us that it is our duty, who believe in Spiritual Freedom, to press for an *alteration* of 'the constitutional practice.' And we are preparing two petitions—(*a*) to Parliament, and (*b*) to the General Assembly of the Church, to the effect that:
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> 'WE, THE UNDERSIGNED, regarding the appointment of Bishops of the Church by the Crown upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister, as contrary to the mind of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Word of God, and the Spiritual Liberty of Christian Men, do ask—
>
> (*a*)—Parliament to provide by Legislation for the removal of this grievance;
>
> (*b*)—The Church Assembly to quicken their Labours, and to pass a Measure to provide for the removal of this grievance without delay.'

This seems to us to be a very ignorant and detrimental document. Unfortunately, we fear that busy, thoughtless, enthusiastic clergymen will sign it, partly misled by its obvious earnestness and pious camouflage, partly because, as the judicious Hooker remarks, there is no one who goeth about to persuade a multitude that they are not so well governed as they ought to be who shall lack for hearers. The clergy are no more exempt than any other class from being led by the nose when their interests seem to point them in that direction.

The fundamental error in this document, arising out of an abysmal ignorance of ecclesiastical history, is the belief that the clergy have a right, inalienable and primitive, to elect the Bishop with the approval or assent of the laity. If we are not mistaken, the election of the Bishop by the clergy belongs to the Dark Ages. The claim of the clergy to elect the Bishop is a usurpation of the rights of the laity; it deprives the laity of a right which they exercised for nearly a thousand years in the Western

Church, and it is plainly contrary to primitive Catholic practice. It is the duty of the clergy, unless the Bishop-elect be plainly unfit for the office, to assent to and approve the choice made by the laity, to assist at his consecration, take the vows of canonical obedience, and observe them faithfully.

The desire of some of the English clergy to secure greater power for their order in this matter, although no new thing, is plainly a very wrong thing. The clergy have to-day as much freedom and authority in the appointment of the Bishop as they ought to have. Before any man can become a diocesan bishop in England three clerical parties have to co-operate. First, the clergyman nominated must consent; secondly, the Dean and Chapter of the Cathedral must elect; thirdly, the Primate and Bishops of the Province must consecrate. If any one of these three parties believe the man nominated to be unfit, we may assume, with a confidence based on our belief in the moral character of the clergy, that they will not co-operate to make him a Bishop.

The real *crux* of the appointment of a Bishop arises from the exercise of their right by the laity. The diocesan laity have the right: the Bishop appointed must be in accordance with their will. How is that will to be expressed? Green, the historian of the English people, held that the lay mind was best represented by the Prime Minister nominating the Bishop. There is much to be said for Green's view. Certainly this much can be said for it, that the Prime Minister's choice is much more likely to express the mind of the laity of the diocese than the majority vote of the laymen in the Diocesan Conference. Certainly we believe that the vast majority of the English laity are satisfied to be represented in this way by the Prime Minister. One reason why the English laity, who as a body are essentially practical and much less *doctrinaire* than the clergy, are content with the present method is because it produces admirable results. Our English episcopate is on the whole the best in the world, and is much superior to episcopates appointed by other methods. Moreover it is certain that our greatest prelates, like the late Archbishop Temple, would never have become bishops if their election had depended on Diocesan Conferences or other new-fangled methods. It is recognized by thoughtful Churchmen that it is no small gain for a diocese by this method

to be delivered from the turmoil and intrigues of an episcopal election, especially at a time when the Church is bitterly divided by contending ecclesiastical parties.

How the signatories of the petition know that this method of appointing Bishops is 'contrary to the mind of our Lord' we should like to be informed, seeing that our Lord left no directions as to the method of episcopal elections, nor have we any in the New Testament. There we are instructed as to the moral qualifications for the episcopal office, and the Prime Minister in nominating is as little likely to fall below that standard as are the clergy. *A Catholic Dictionary* which received the *imprimatur* of Cardinal Manning, and the approbation of Cardinal Newman, in summing up the appointment of Bishops remarks:

> 'It is evident from what has been said that the discipline of the Church with regard to the appointment of bishops has varied from age to age.'

There seems to-day to be no case in England for making any further change. Tinkering with the constitution either of State or Church is a seductive but very dangerous undertaking. There are occasions for it, but they arise only when the need is great.

The signatories of the petition, like the modern novelists who treat of marriage, do not seem to recognize that the State has any rights in the matter. Certainly the State has claimed rights and has exercised them for centuries in both the West and East, even in the case of the Popes—the last of mortals to recognize such claims and to yield to them. When a religious communion becomes a legal corporation for the purpose of securing rights, such as the right to hold property, it comes under the authority of the State, and must either accept the State's authority or forfeit its legal rights. If the statement that 'The Crown has no right in the Realm of the Soul' denies this right of the State, then the affirmation is mere nonsense. If it means that the State has no spiritual or moral right to determine the Faith of the Church, we should all agree; but the appointment of Bishops in this particular case is not a matter of Faith but one of Order. It ought to be recognized that the State has the moral right to restrict, reform, or even abolish any Church which seeks to overthrow the State either by revolutionary propaganda or foreign aggression, or a Church which is corrupting

public and private morals, or is creating paralysing divisions and antagonisms among citizens. This must be granted unless we take a secularist view of the State and its obligations—and such we believe to be becoming more and more discredited among men of goodwill. As Hooker pointed out, for the State to confine itself merely to the material interests and economic conditions of the people is to play the part of a swineherd and fatten men up as though they were hogs.

In religion the duty of the State is to co-operate with the Church for the good of the nation, and in its national relations the duty of the Church is to co-operate with the State for the good of the nation. Although their aim be one, the functions of both differ, and are best kept distinct. The ministering of the Word and Sacraments are best left to the Church; the functions of justice, defence, taxation, etc., to the State. The relation between State and Church is like that of husband and wife, wherein, as St. Paul argued, the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the believing husband, and the unbelieving husband by the believing wife. Everything should be done to encourage that temper of mutual respect and confidence between Church and State upon which fruitful co-operation depends, and they who in the name of Christian Liberty would do otherwise are playing the part of the Serpent in Eden.

The Future of Anglican Foreign Missions.

The very serious situation of our Anglican Foreign Missions is evident from the proceedings of the extremely well-organized Missionary Convention held at Westminster during the last week in January.

Two classes of facts were placed with vividness and emphasis before the assembled audiences. (1) The actual situation in the various foreign mission fields; and (2) the number of missionaries and the sums of money needed to cope with the situation in each field. To judge by the reports, the difficulties and the needs of foreign missions were never greater than now. Yet we are also assured that in some respects the actual situation was never more hopeful, nor greater awards awaiting sustained and enterprising endeavour. Old civilizations are

crumbling: ancient religions are losing their hold: the desire for Western knowledge is overwhelming among the student populations of the Orient: Islam is becoming modernized in its aspirations and outlook. But the obstacles also are great. The Christian religion is regarded in the East as a foreign religion, and as hostile to the claims of the awakened nationalist spirit. Moreover it is evident that, while the gifts of our Christian civilization are desired, the Christian religion is not desired, or at least Europeanized Christianity is not desired. The Oriental is ready to welcome the Christian missionary if he comes as an educationalist, or as a medical practitioner, or as a philanthropist and social worker; but he does not desire him as a teacher of the Christian religion. The greater Christian missionaries are quite willing to-day to identify themselves with the ideals of Oriental nationalism, except in those extreme forms which, as in India, might bring them into antagonism with the Government. They are even willing, in a spirit of Christian self-abnegation, to serve the community and help it to reform its vices, heal its miseries, improve its health, enlighten its mind, uplift and widen its outlook without seeking to secure thereby proselytes for the Christian Church. They feel that the Orient will at a later stage desire a Christian Church when the value of the Christian fellowship is realized; meanwhile they are willing in Christ's name to serve communities which are ready enough to receive their services but not their Lord, or at least their Lord as presented by traditional Christian theology. Hence success or failure in the mission field of the East to-day is not to be judged by the number of actual converts, but by the general influence for good which the missionaries are exercising, and we may add that that influence is not small.

The Westminster Missionary Convention raises the weighty question: What is it needful to provide for our foreign missions that they may have much greater success than is theirs at present? Many will answer: 'More missionaries and more money.' That is a most inadequate answer, and yet a most natural one. The High Command of an army may tell the public that what is needful for military success is more troops and more guns, whereas what is really needed is a new High Command and entirely different strategy and tactics.

In our view, one of the greatest of our missionary needs is a truthful, simple theology : one which is in harmony with experience, history, science. This need we cannot discover was emphasized in the Convention's papers and speeches, and yet we have very good reason for believing it to be a crying need. We are informed that Jesus Himself has great attraction for the Oriental, that His Gospel of the Kingdom in its spiritual and moral teaching (not in its apocalyptic) is also most attractive, but that our traditionalist dogmatic theology and much of our ecclesiastical institutionalism repel the Oriental. Are our Church authorities, in response to the call of the non-Christian world, ready with single-minded courage to go back once more to our Lord and His Gospel and draw their theology from Him? Are they, for instance, ready to make the Lord's Prayer their Creed and the Beatitudes their moral ideal? 'Certainly not,' it will be said. 'These are totally inadequate : we want more than Jesus and the Gospel of the Kingdom : we want also the Church's Gospel about Jesus : we need the Christ of the Catholic Church, and we need the Catholic Church also.' We believe that many things are indicating that the answer is wrong. When we regard the creed of Jesus, discipleship to Jesus, fellowship with the disciples of Jesus, the spirit of Jesus, and nothing more as *essentials* of the Christian religion we shall be able to advance triumphantly in the foreign mission field, and indeed in the home field too. At present we are weighed down with theological and ecclesiastical *impedimenta*—the cause of endless disputes and harrowing divisions because we will insist, like the Pharisees of old, on laying them on other men's shoulders, whether Pagan or Christian.

Another great missionary need is that the Christian Church at home should be able to produce a noble civilization from which many of the horrible blots which mar the life of so-called Christian Europe are eliminated. Our slums, our night-clubs, our drunkenness, the luxury and vulgarity of our *nouveaux riches*, our gutter press, the salacious character of many of our public entertainments, our gambling, our industrial strife, our class antagonisms, the horrors of the late war, constitute a tremendous indictment against the claim of the Christian Church to produce a noble civilization. The Oriental, of the student

class especially, sees all this very plainly; but he does not see as plainly that the Christian religion is not only against these things, but that it creates a consciousness in any community where it exists that these things are objectionable and should be eliminated, even though it be not strong enough to eliminate them. This spirit, we venture to think, does not exist to anything like the same degree in any other religion. We believe that in our British civilization there are many good and beautiful things which we owe to the Christian religion in our midst, and which non-Catholic countries do not possess. Our British civilization has got in it the power of progress. It is better to-day, take it for all in all, than it has been at any other preceding period. Moreover it can be shown to be superior to any other civilization. Our proximity to the Continent and the influx of aliens make us worse than we should otherwise be. Nevertheless, the Christian Church in our midst is the most influential factor for good in our civilization, and if that Church would only scrap its mediaevalism, heal its divisions, and make full use of that knowledge which the Divine Spirit is giving us to-day, we should see tremendous advances in building Jerusalem in England's green and pleasant land. Nevertheless, until our English civilization can rise to higher levels than at present, the English missionary in foreign fields is greatly handicapped.

Besides our elaborate and out-of-date theology, our contentious and divided Christian Church, our defective, and in some ways disgusting, civilization, there is another tremendous hindrance to our foreign missions. It is the growing antagonism of the yellow and coloured races to the dominance of the white races, and not least of the British race with its immense empire. It is not our rule, which is remarkable for its humanitarianism, but our ascendancy, which excites jealousy and hatred among the ruling classes of these races. Weakness on our part will not conciliate the growing spirit of antagonism and militarism which is afflicting the Eastern world from Egypt to China. The Napoleonic remedy of 'a few whiffs of grape-shot' is as impossible for us as are pacificism and retreat. We have to stay and do our task. The resolution not to exploit those we govern, combined with the policy of educating them up to the level when they shall be able to govern themselves in the spirit of a

free, righteous, progressive democracy is, we believe, the avowed policy of the British Empire. Such a policy is as statesmanlike as it is Christian, but the carrying of it out demands no little virtue and wisdom, no little firmness and fortitude—yet to depart from it and relinquish the task would be to do a grievous wrong to the submerged millions in our Eastern territories. Unfortunately these political problems are not the only ones which confront our Empire and Church abroad. There are problems connected with the rising tide of colour; problems which are both eugenic and economic.

For instance, our rule in India has done much to abolish those wars, plagues, and famines by which the growth of population was checked. Now the increase in population seeks relief in emigration to other parts of the British Empire, *e.g.*, Kenya, South Africa, Guiana, the South Pacific. This emigration is only rendered possible by the *pax Britannica*. It is causing serious difficulties in some of these communities. Moreover emigration is no real remedy. Prudential birth-control is the only remedy for the economic dangers which threaten India, and this is equally true of China and Japan. We are certain that under no circumstances will the British Dominions in the Pacific admit these races to their territories. The Australians, for instance, believe that their admission would produce the most disastrous results. If that be so, the Christian religion justifies their refusal. Just as the Empire is faced with these problems of inter-marriage, misgenation, sterilization and segregation, so is the Anglican Communion, but we do not seem to have had any clear teaching about these matters at the Westminster Convention—yet we need it greatly in shaping our foreign mission policy. The Divine Will about them is learnt by scrutinizing the teachings of science, history, and experience in the light of Christian principles. Unless we can get this knowledge we can get no sound policy for our foreign missions, and so we become the slaves of sentimentality, prejudice, and platitudes.

The front line of our Anglican foreign missions no doubt requires support and attention, but there is need for much greater work at the home-base—work which requires scientific research and brave and clear thought and speech. To-day we use the word love a great deal in Christian circles. It is believed

to cover everything, even a multitude of sins; but love has got to be reconciled with truth, wisdom, and justice; indeed, it ought to be their inspiring spirit. It cannot take their place. We are inclined to think that in the atmosphere of love and enthusiasm at Westminster there was a tendency to ignore a number of hard facts and very painful and difficult problems. At last we are beginning to realize that there are no water-tight compartments within which our problems can be solved. They all, whether economic and industrial, political and social, hygienic and eugenic, moral and religious, merge into and re-act on one another.

Dr. Timothy Richards, who spent forty years as a missionary in the Far East, wrote at the end of it in 1910:

> 'The whole intelligent world is getting tired of the struggle concerning the different doctrines and practices of the various religions and their sub-divisions into many hundreds of sects, but all are eager to know what light any or all of them can throw on—
>
> How to deliver one-tenth of the world from poverty and oppression.
>
> How to deliver one-half of the world from violent men, who produce strikes, riots, rebellions, and wars.
>
> How to deliver more than half the world from ignorance and superstition, so that the fruits of the best knowledge God has given us may be reaped.
>
> How to deliver all human hearts from the disease of selfishness and sin, that they may be made right with God and man.
>
> To answer these questions aright is to begin the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth, which Jesus Christ commanded His disciples to preach, and this is the one Great Religion of the future.'[1]

Are our Anglican Foreign Missions and our Church at home out to do this, or is our policy, to use Bishop Creighton's words, that of 'upholding a system, not making it operative on life'?

The Coming Conference of Modern Churchmen.

The annual Conference of Modern Churchmen this year will be held on the 6th—13th September at Girton College, Cambridge. Some of our happiest Conferences, and certainly some of our most influential, have been held in this delightful spot. The subject chosen for consideration is 'Sacraments.' It is no doubt a highly controversial issue at present in the English

[1] *The New Testament of Higher Buddhism*, p. 35.

Church. It is not, however, the aim of the Conference to treat it controversially. It is because there is unfortunately a strong temptation to treat it controversially, and so to arrive at wrong conclusions, that the Conference authorities decided to select it for this year. The purpose of the Conference is to treat it educationally. If the saying, '*Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*,' be true, the history of a thing will constitute the best criterion of its nature and value. The aim of the Conference therefore is: (1) To present a clear conspectus of the history of sacramental theory and practice. (2) To help members of the Conference to understand the principles and conceptions which are involved. (3) To show the bearing of Christian thought and history upon the problems arising in connection with the subject in the present day.

Among those who have accepted invitations to read papers are Professor Nairne on Semitic Sacramentalism, Professor Percy Gardner on the Mystery Cults, Canon Bindley on Patristic Sacramental Theories, Archdeacon Lilley on Western Sacramental Theory down to Aquinas, Canon Simpson of St. Paul's on the Christian Doctrine of Grace, Dr. Norman Sykes on the Reformers and the Sacraments, Canon Tollinton on Sacraments since the Reformation, the Rev. R. D. Richardson on the Mystics and the Sacraments, Canon Guy Rogers on the value of the Sacraments to-day, Canon Wilson of Cheltenham on some Modern Problems connected with the use of Sacraments, Canon Leslie Hunter on the Arts in relation to the Sacraments. We hope also to have papers from Professor Bacon and Professor Kirsopp Lake. As on former occasions, Miss Nussey, of Upper Ewe Croft, Ilkley, is honorary secretary of the Conference, and all applications for information and tickets should be made to her.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON EUGENICS AND RELIGION

By the Rt. Rev. E. W. Barnes, Sc.D., Hon. D.D., F.R.S.,
Bishop of Birmingham.

EUGENICS is the science of human betterment. Its object is to discover how we may breed better human beings The eugenist seeks to improve human racial stocks in the belief that he can thereby quicken the process of civilization. He fixes attention primarily on the individual and not on his surroundings. He is concerned with nature rather than nurture, with the innate qualities which the individual inherits rather than with the environment in which those qualities have an opportunity of growth and expression. Eugenics and Sociology are thus complementary to one another. The extravagant eugenist says that the swine makes the stye. The extravagant sociologist says that the stye makes the swine. Neither statement expresses the full truth, and even expert biologists differ widely as to the extent to which the balance of truth inclines one way or the other.

It cannot be disputed that the innate good qualities which a man inherits fail to develop in bad surroundings. Ignorance, dirt, vicious example, and abject poverty degrade personality. They prevent the growth of that which is best in a child and stimulate its baser instincts. So strong in the life of a child are the influences of what the psychologists call *association* and *suggestion* that many think that environment is of more importance than heredity. It must be admitted that our knowledge as to what constitutes 'heredity' lacks precision. We are ignorant as to how far a child receives from its parents at conception a set of physical and psychical fundamentals which no environment will change. But statistical enquiries in general confirm the common saying that 'like begets like.' We have, moreover, to remember that civilization is a racial product. The forces of association and suggestion which act on any individual within it, no less than most of his physical surroundings, are the

* The Galton Lecture delivered before the Eugenics Education Society at their Meeting in London at 8.30 p.m. on Tuesday, February 16th, 1926.

creation of the race. If the racial stock be good, such forces and physical conditions will gradually become more beneficial. If the stock be poor, both its physical environment and mental atmosphere will gradually degenerate. The ultimate creative power of a civilization resides in the innate racial qualities of the people which make it, whatever be the process by which those qualities were initially produced.

No nation is homogeneous. Probably all races result from a blend of peoples of different types. A so-called pure race is one which has lived so long free from alien intrusion that a uniform type has been gradually evolved. In such a race the fundamentals due to heredity have been thoroughly mixed. Among its members there is therefore a naturally strong social cohesion. Individuals think, feel, and act in much the same way. In particular there will be uniformity of religious outlook. For a pure race what Disraeli called 'the religion of all sensible men' is a definite entity.

When a nation is mixed and, in particular, when one race imposes itself upon another there can be no such unity. At first the apparent civilization will be that of the dominant race. Culture will be created by the ruling aristocracy : and the populace will accept organization by which it benefits though this be based on principles and ideas with which it has little sympathy or understanding. This situation probably existed when Greek civilization reached its zenith. Ultimately the ruling stocks died out, dissipated by war or luxury. Such of their descendants as survived were the offspring of mixed marriages, racially impure. Now when two races are thus mixed the individual seems to lack stability of organization. The characteristics derived from his parents are associated rather than blended. Probably it is only after a fairly large number of generations that a new type of harmony is created. In the early generations the physical characters of one or other of the parental types may be dominant : but the recessive strain cannot be ignored, and I believe that in the fundamentals of the mind there is disharmony. The distrust of half-castes is not the outcome of mere prejudice. They are often unstable in character. In the popular phrase, 'you never know what they will do next.' It is impossible to foretell which side of their mental inheritance will be uppermost on any particular occasion.

After a sufficient number of generations a mixed race evolves a unity, a unity in diversity, of its own. Which of the two strands which go to make it is dominant? The answer seems to be that which is indigenous to the soil. Black and white in England mate and white survives. Black and white in Jamaica mate and black survives. There seems little doubt that in ancient Greece the original population gradually asserted itself. Most certainly the great intellectual achievements of the Golden Age were gradually ignored; they were submerged by primitive folk-beliefs thrust up from the populace. Moreover, where the physical characters of one or of two mixed races prove the stronger, the mental qualities of that race are usually dominant, and *vice versa*. The half-caste in Jamaica not only becomes darker in successive generations, but he also becomes more negroid in his habit of mind. Language, as we know, is no criterion of racial origin. But ideas, and especially religious ideas, are a very good criterion as to which strain in a mixed race has proved the stronger. The religious practices and beliefs of the black Republic of Hayti are not, according to good observers, vastly different from those of the African jungle.

I am suggesting that the fundamentals of the mind persist, from generation to generation, roughly to the same extent as distinctive physical characters of the body. Mental tendencies are, I believe, much more permanent than is commonly supposed. A higher culture or a new religion may be given to a race, but, if left to itself, its old culture and its old religion will emerge but slightly camouflaged. Take, for instance, Christianity in Southern Italy. Nominally the Iberian stock in Southern Italy has been Christian for some fifteen centuries. Christianity is a form of ethical theism: but the actual faith of the Southern Italian is magical polytheism, camouflaged as sacramentalism and the prayers of the saints. It was essentially the worship which prevailed among the Mediterranean Iberians before the Christian era. Invaders may sweep over the land: a new religion may be nominally established. But the old stock with the old faith effectively triumphs.

Such conclusions are disconcerting to enthusiasts; but this is mainly because enthusiasts are short-term optimists. Can we rightly expect any great fundamental change in a well-established stock in a couple of thousand years? When we consider

that the human race has been evolving for something like a million years must we not expect that progress will be slow, especially if conditions do not make for the survival of the fittest?

And here I come to the heart of my subject. How can we secure the survival of the fittest, and therefore the survival and development of the fittest types of religious aspiration and understanding?

I wish that the experts could reach agreement as to how variations arise in what is apparently a fairly homogeneous stock. All admit that there is a tendency to fluctuation observable in successive generations. Is this tendency inherent in the life-process? Is it affected by use and disuse, so that acquired characteristics are ultimately inherited? Do small variations and large mutations alike result from combinations of parental characteristics, latent or patent? Is the growth of the cell from which a new life takes its beginning merely dependent on the initial nature of the genes in the chromosomes? It seems to me that we must postulate some creative activity in the life-process, a constant 'more or less' flux. If we dislike any form of vitalism we may ascribe this to the activity of mind, of that unknown reality which in varying degrees is present in all living things. This carries us little further because we do not know what mind is, nor how it has seized upon certain chemical compounds, of which carbon is the most important element. What I would insist upon is that a survey of the whole evolutionary process negatives the idea of a mere unpacking or reassortment of what was already present in primal organisms. New things have been created, new degrees of reality have emerged, in earth's life-history. We cannot, of course, separate the process by which life has become progressively more complex from the environment in which change has occurred. The environment may cause or direct the change. Most certainly the environment destroys individuals not adapted for survival within it.

We have, however, to recognize that the changes which occur owing, as I believe, to creative activity within the life-process are not always what we should consider valuable. If I may use the language of religion, God has not made man, and is not perfecting human civilization, by causing offspring to be always slightly better or slightly more highly organized than were the parents. He allows a type of change which to our

value-judgments can be either good or bad. Within certain limits degeneration is as likely as progress. And this is true whether the changes which we observe are large or small, inheritable or not. God's judgment on this random process of change is expressed by the subsequent action of the environment in which it occurs. By what is termed 'the ruthlessness of Nature' He weeds out the less valuable products of His plan.

The thought that God acts in this way is often disliked and ignored by those who wish to retain a belief in ethical Theism. They recoil from the idea that He permits degeneration as well as progress to take place. Their distress would be less acute if they remembered that environment is equally His creation. However perplexed we may be by the whole scheme, the fact remains that it has led to the successive emergence of more highly organized animal types culminating in man. And moreover in man there has been, owing to this process, a growth of moral excellence and spiritual understanding. By spiritual understanding I mean man's knowledge that the obligations of truth and goodness are imposed upon him from without by the very nature of things: that we ought to be loyal to absolute standards outside ourselves: that there are in the universe absolute values which transcend space and will outlast time. Man, by acquiring such understanding, has begun to enter the Kingdom of the good, the beautiful and the true. The tree is known by its fruits, and the character of the Creator must be judged by the final outcome of His plan. The existence of evil has always seemed to challenge the goodness of God: our knowledge of the evolutionary process does not really increase perplexity.

By whatever process new characteristics arise in man and in the lower forms of life, it is certain that some are inheritable. It is certain, moreover, that this is true alike of physical and mental characteristics. The structure of the mind is engendered with the body. Both are profoundly affected by the circumstances of life: yet some fundamentals are given at the start. And by the mind we mean the whole personality of a man. No dichotomy of human personality, such as St. Paul took from the philosophy of his time, is satisfactory. When we speak of the immortality of the soul we mean the survival of human personality, or of such a development of that personality as gives it complete survival-value. I have said that the relation of mind

to body is an unsolved enigma. We can only accept the fact that just as healthy, well-formed parents normally have healthy, well-formed children, so able parents generally have able children. Moreover, there is no doubt that regard for religion and the ethical ideals with which it is associated is inherited. There are stocks in which spiritual aspiration shows itself, in various manifestations, from generation to generation. Few religious leaders of fame and power lack ancestors, possibly in quite humble circumstances, who showed religious enthusiasm. Equally, of course, parents of poor mental quality and vicious tendencies, unresponsive to the elevating influences with which they may gain contact, have like children. Such stocks are a burden and a source of weakness to the community.

But why do good stocks produce degenerate offspring? We all know cases when the parents, each apparently healthy and sound in mind, with a well-balanced nervous organization, have a child which is semi-imbecile. Is feeble-mindedness a dysgenic mutation, the 'spontaneous' appearance of a new and bad variant? Is genius similarly a eugenic mutation? The probable answer is that each results from a chance combination of parental factors, a combination, moreover, which has some element of hereditary permanence. Statistical biology makes it certain that the man of genius, if he leaves descendants, usually hands on to some among them more than usual ability. And feeble-mindedness, once established, will crop out generation after generation.

We can leave genius to take care of itself, though we have to admit that it is curiously and distressingly unfertile. This lack of fertility manifests itself in men of religious genius, in a John Wesley no less than in an Isaac Newton. But the feeble-minded are disastrously prolific, and their fecundity must be a grave concern to every religious man and woman. The problem constantly confronts religious teachers. A Bishop is asked: What can be done as regards the confirmation of mentally-defective adolescents? They have no capacity of response to religious teaching: and in the poorer quarters of our great cities the clergy are constantly met by border-line cases, children and adults, in whom it is impossible to arouse any spiritual aspiration. I do not ask you to be concerned with their non-acceptance of some particular form of religious faith. The trouble is that

these people are at such a low mental level that they have no instinct for spiritual values.

What is to be done with them? The harsh conditions of our civilization until a century ago weeded them out. There was a ruthlessness against which our humane instincts revolt. To-day social changes, consequent on the more Christian organization of the State, enable them to survive.

Very strong arguments can be brought forward for the sterilization of mental defectives. Such were advanced in a recent letter to *The Times* (January 18th, 1926), signed by a number of eminent medical men. The signatories urged that sentiment and ignorance should not be allowed to prevent legislation. Though they did not explicitly say so, they must be well aware that Christian religious sentiment instinctively sets itself against their proposals. The opposition may not be permanent; but its grounds are worth stating. Christianity seeks to create the Kingdom of God, the community of the elect. It tries to make what we may call a spiritually-eugenic society. It recognizes that by no means all human beings are fit for this society. 'Many are called, but few are chosen,' is a saying of its Founder, the truth of which continuous experience has verified. But, also, Christianity affirms the rights and value of the individual simply as a human being. And, together with this affirmation, the belief has been strong that all men are potentially sons of God, so made that, if they will, they can enter the Kingdom. 'No man is so vile, so degraded,' says the Protestant evangelist, 'that we can pronounce *a priori* that his conversion is hopeless.' 'Through the sacraments there is salvation for all,' says the Catholic. Yet an evangelical movement always ends by creating a spiritual aristocracy. And though group-suggestion through sacramental worship is powerful, suggestion is always a process of give and take. The low-grade worshipper gives base metal for gold. Thus insensibly the moral level of the group-consciousness becomes lowered. And in the end unethical sacramentalism becomes a drag on spiritual progress.

The facts are well known: yet belief in the possibility of the salvation of all men, of bringing all into the Kingdom, persists. Such belief in the inherent value of the individual has great ethical importance. It is doubtful whether you will do unto others as you would that they should do unto you, if you think

that they are not fundamentally of potentially equal value with yourself. The great bond of social unity is that we regard our fellow-citizens as sharing with ourselves the full heritage of humanity.

Now eugenists have made it clear that mental defectives not only lack some of the most valuable qualities of our human heritage, but also that they often transmit such lack to their offspring. Yet a doubt remains as to whether there is no latent power of recovery. The question is asked : Among the children of parents both mentally defective, is it not possible that normal human beings, or even genius, may be found? Until a negative answer can be given to this question, Christian sentiment will be slow in giving approval to sterilization proposals. The Christian community, though very conservative, is by no means devoid of common-sense. If you could demonstrate that the feeble-minded were not only in themselves a social burden, but also that there was nothing latent in them of value to the race, you would rapidly win Christian sympathy and support. I doubt if you will ever be able to do this. But, if you show, as it can be shown, that the feeble-minded normally have so many defective descendants that their fecundity is a barrier to the extension of spiritual perception, you will gradually get Christians to approve action by which such fecundity is checked.

There seems to be no evidence which would warrant the belief that from bad stocks good can never be created. My friend Professor MacBride argues, from Tornier's work on the production of gold-fish, that mutations to be observed in domestic animals and plants result from 'germ-weakening' under artificial conditions. He consequently rejects the idea that such mutations can play a decisive part in the process of evolution. But does not the same line of argument suggest that mental deficiency may be due to germ-weakening under artificial conditions? I understand that if gold-fish were allowed to breed freely under natural conditions, they would revert to the small grey carp from which they were derived. Domestic animals, when they run wild, tend to revert to natural types. Our sense of values is determined by human fancy and human appetite : and we therefore term such reversion a degeneration to the original type. But from the point of view of Nature the reversion is surely a reversal of the artificial disorder which man has pro-

duced. Has man not produced conditions which make for similar disorder in his own race? The industrial revolution has within half a dozen generations removed the greater part of our people from the healthy influence of unspoiled nature. Slum life, drugs, artificial pleasures and excitements *may* surely produce germ-weakening. But is it not possible that the simple life, to use a convenient phrase, would be sufficient to breed, even from the feeble-minded, a mentally healthy stock? I put the question diffidently in the search for information.

It is well known to all social workers that the part of our population which lacks ability, initiative, self-reliance and energy tends to remain in the central areas of our great cities. The clergy who work in these areas find that any individuals who show exceptional enterprise soon move away. There is thus an automatic segregation of the unfit. But these unfit shew every possible degree of what I venture to call germ-weakening. Mental deficiency is not a definite abnormality to be sharply distinguished from the normal. It is the extreme illustration of a graduated process. The average level of mental life of a slum area in which segregation has taken place is exceptional, much lower than that of the community as a whole. Religious work in such an area is practically hopeless. Even among the children the response is slight: among adults it is negligible. The few who 'have the religious sense' are those who sooner or later leave the area. Such facts, which are commonplaces to anyone engaged in religious administration, are worthy of the close attention of eugenists. I suggest to you that absence of any kind of religious interest is evidence of mental abnormality. Man is a religious animal, though he is by no means always naturally Christian either in temper or thought. The saying 'the nearer the soil, the nearer to God' is, of course, an exaggeration. But those who are uprooted from the soil are a difficult religious problem. Some, as I have said, have no apparent capacity for religious response. Others, in more prosperous ranks of society, often turn to 'cranky' types of belief, in which the student of comparative religion can recognise a close affinity to low-grade expressions of the religious sense which have previously arisen in human evolution. Those of us who are concerned to preserve the highest type of religion, which is a harmony in which the elation of the mystic is fused with reason and ethical principle,

are greatly troubled by the present religious chaos. It is almost a commonplace that the religious fancies that run riot to-day bear a singular likeness to those which were widespread in classical civilisation during the second century of our era. Have they been produced by similiar social conditions? Are they the result of urban life? Is it true that the development of the constituents of the chromosomes in the germ-cells is injuriously affected by the way in which infants are reared in crowded areas, by life under artificial light, by alcohol, by conditions which militate against a natural and healthy sexual life? The problem is immensely important. Religious decay is not merely a sign of social ill-health: its consequence is likely to be increased social degeneration. That such decay exists is undoubted. I receive an amazing number of letters, of manuscripts and printed disquisitions, which testify to its prevalence. And some experience of controversy has made me realise how weak is the regard for truth of certain types of religious zealots. The power of suggestion, emotional upset due to the war, imperfect education—all may be contributory factors to the prevailing religious degeneration: and we do not forget that the foolish are always with us. It may be that the type of our population is changing: that the Nordic strain is less resistent than the Iberian to hostile influences in our present manner of life. But it is hardly likely that such a change should have been so rapid. If the standpoint popularized by Professor Jennings in his *Prometheus* should pass the test of further research, we should be tempted to conclude that the artificial conditions of modern urban life are injurious to the development of the genes which the individual receives from his parents. We should then deduce that a return to the simple life would be the best way of furthering religious progress. Most certainly observation of the Quakers confirms this conclusion. They are our spiritual aristocrats, and by the simplicity of their manner of life they stand apart from the great mass of the community. I would add that the simple life need be neither barren nor falsely ascetic: marriage and children should normally have a place within it.

A group of representative citizens, including some leading surgeons, has recently urged the value of the simple life as a protection against ill-health. In my belief that the physical and psychical characteristics of humanity are in much the same

fashion products of heredity and environment, I welcome their plea. It seems to me that such knowledge as we have indicates that a more natural way of living would create mental no less than physical health, and in particular that it would be of direct religious value.

Darwin's philosophy has been well summarized by Professor D'Arcy Thompson in the words :

> 'Fit and unfit arise alike, but what is fit to survive does survive and what is unfit perishes.'

Whatever be the detailed mechanism of evolution, the broad principle thus enunciated admits of no dispute. It has destroyed the old narrow teleology. It has made us see that we must assign as much importance to the environment which God has created as to the capacity for variation which He has given to living organisms. But, if we take this wider standpoint, there is nothing in this philosophy inconsistent with the Christian outlook. God's progressive action, His creative activity leading to spiritual understanding in man, remains. God, by allowing fit and unfit to arise alike and by using environment to destroy the unfit, has produced in humanity spiritual understanding. But He has also made man to a small yet increasing degree master of his own fate. We can do something, much more than we have yet done, to make human environment favourable to the survival of those qualities in humanity which we rightly value and of human beings in whom those qualities occur. But we must not create an environment in which the feeble-minded, the criminal, and the insane can multiply rapidly. Though such persons may have some descendants of social value, it is statistically demonstrable that the average of their descendants will be below the normal. When they breed freely, they are an impediment to the creation of what the Christian terms the Kingdom of God on earth. The humane man, as a consequence of his religious instinct, desires a good environment for all who may be born into the world. He is learning that he cannot get his desires unless his social organization is such that degenerates leave no offspring. When religious people realize that, in thus preventing the survival of the socially unfit, they are working in accordance with the plan by which God has brought humanity so far on its road, their objections to repressive action will vanish.

THE REFORMED FRENCH CHURCH

By the Rev. Arthur Watson, M.A., Vicar of Alston.

AS Seamen's Chaplain in the port of Dunkirk, I was fortunate in that I came into touch with the French Reformed Church.

I cannot but feel a kindness for a Church which shows itself 'gentle for Christ's sake to strangers,' and, after all, there is a tie of blood between the sister churches of the Reformation; Englishmen have fought for the Huguenot cause, and they gave us Casaubon and Saravia. Of the former a modern historian says:

> 'He turned to the English Church, and found there not only a welcome for his brilliant scholarship, but the haven of peace for which his devout and conscientious soul had been sighing. His standpoint he found to be practically identical with that of the rising school of English theology. His gain was significant, not merely as being the gain of a distinguished adherent, but as being a proof of the fact that the theological position of the English Church was not in its essence an anomaly or a peculiar outcome of English circumstance, but a position which would appeal to a mind characterised by a combination of sound theological learning with personal piety, wherever such might happen to be found. The point had already been shown once before in the case of Hadrian Saravia, the French theologian and pastor who became the defender of English episcopacy in the last decade of the sixteenth century, and the friend and confessor of Hooker.'

Another more modern link between our own Church and the Reformed Church is to be found in the custom which prevailed till recently in the appointment to the vicarage of Sark in the Channel Islands of a pastor of the Reformed Church. The services there were until quite recently conducted entirely in French, the version of the Book of Common Prayer being that made by the Rev. John Durel, later Dean of Windsor, and approved by Gilbert Sheldon, Bishop of London, in 1662. I understand that the presentee to the benefice used to come over to England on his way to the island and receive episcopal ordination from the Bishop of Winchester, being ordained deacon and priest *per saltum* in the same visit.

I have myself conducted both the Sunday services and the occasional offices in Sark, using this book. It is to be hoped that this vernacular liturgy will never be disused.

The happiest relations formerly prevailed—I am now speaking of 1896—between the Nonconformists there and the members of the Anglican Church, the former being accustomed to attend the Church service, and the Vicar and some of his people attending the Methodist class in the week. The appointment of a Genevan pastor as vicar, with the approval of the Bishop of Winchester, was the arrangement originally determined by the Seigneur of Sark, Helier de Carteret, in 1565, who nominated Pasteur Elie Brevint.

I venture to offer a few notes on the liturgy, the Church organization, and the chief movements in the French Reformed Church to-day. The part taken by the Reformer, Peter Martyr, in compiling our book of Common Prayer, as shown by his correspondence with Cranmer and Calvin, makes the reformed liturgy of great interest to Anglican readers. My knowledge is partial, being based on an acquaintance with a single church and its pastor. I am greatly indebted to him for his brotherly fellowship. Educated in the Ecole Normale and the faculty of Protestant Theology at Paris, a pupil of Auguste Sabatier, he would, sometimes with an officer from the barracks or a professor from the college, try to show me what Protestantism stands for to-day.

The French Protestant Church at Dunkirk, though recruited from other sources, owes its beginning to the help given by Scottish Presbyterians. The linen and jute industries at Lille and Roubaix were bringing to France great numbers of Scots. The Presbyterian Church at Roubaix started a daughter mission at Dunkirk, which gradually incorporated local French elements. The congregation even yet contains Scots, descendants of the original members.

The Huguenot Church in the crypt of Canterbury Cathedral, with seats round the Communion Table, is for most of us our first introduction to the French Reformed Church. Signboards, *Au Temple Protestant*, guide us to the building. On entering, we see on either side of the chancel-arch the painted tables which our own churches were once compelled to place in the same position, showing the Ten Commandments on one and the Apostles' Creed and the Lord's Prayer on the other. The position of the altar in our churches is here filled by a two-decker pulpit, the lower tier serving as a reading-desk; in front

of this stands the Communion Table, placed crosswise within the rails. The pastor wears a black gown, white bands, and a cap such as lawyers and graduates wear.

The preface to the Prayer-book states that it represents the liturgy as revised by the Official General Synod of 1897. The services for Sunday morning, Holy Baptism, the Lord's Supper, the Blessing of Marriage, and the Visitation of the Sick date from the first half of the sixteenth century. In the eighteenth century there was added at Geneva the formulary for the Reception of Catechumens.

The principle of revision has always been admitted and applied, both for the translation of the Bible, for the Psalter, for the wording of the Confession of Faith, for the Articles of Discipline, and for the Liturgy. The last official revision was made in 1689. Since that time there have been a number of unofficial revisions by individual pastors. In 1884 the Synod of Nantes resolved that a uniform liturgy was desirable, which should also include services for Holy Week, for the Consecration of Pastors, and for the Burial Office. After long deliberation, the Synod of Sedan in 1896 approved the revision. Of the ancient liturgies, one, the Visitation of the Sick, has fallen into desuetude. This policy of revision satisfies at once the need for continuity and the need for progress.

The Sunday morning service has been modified by the introduction of sung versicles and responses, '*chants dits spontanés*.' Following the desire of Calvin, the Promises of Grace, taken from the New Testament, are added to the Confession of Sin. The Apostles' Creed is placed before the sermon, 'in the interest of logic and unity.'

The Reformed Liturgy of France, like those of Switzerland and Holland, has added commemoration of great festivals, *i.e.*, dedication and missionary festivals, the service of humiliation, the opening of the Synod, Passion Sunday, and the festival of the Reformation (the first Sunday in November), as in the German Protestant churches. The book is recommended to the faithful not only for public worship, but for domestic prayer.

In the Table of Lessons, while certain titles have been avoided, others have been retained as being part of the great Christian tradition of the first centuries. Amongst those retained are Advent, Christmas, Septuagesima, with Sexagesima

morning, and begins with special lessons. The first lesson is taken from each of the Gospels:

Matt. xxviii, 9-20, *Luke* x, 16,
Mark xvi, 15, *John* xx, 21-22.

The second lesson is taken from the Epistles:

Eph. iv, 4-7 and 11-16, I *Tim.* iii, 1-7,
Acts xx, 28, I *Pet.* v, 2-4.

In the exhortation the Reformed Church of France declares her unity with the churches of the Reformation, the supreme authority of Holy Scripture in matters of faith, and the fact of salvation by faith in Christ. The Church maintains as the basis of her teaching, worship and discipline the great Christian facts represented in her sacraments and expressed in her liturgies, notably in the Confession of Sin, the Apostles' Creed, and the Liturgy of the Holy Communion.

The candidate, kneeling, places his right hand on the open Bible and states his assent in the words, 'I declare it before God.' He then promises to lead souls to Christ, and to be the servant of the brethren even as Christ. He promises to follow in the steps of the faithful pastors of the Church, who by the sanctity of their lives, and often by the heroism of their deaths, followed the example of the Apostles. He is enjoined not to lord it over God's heritage, to keep secret all confessions made to him (saving high treason), and to be faithful to the principles of liberty and order which since the Reformation have assured the strength and independence of the Church, and to keep peace with all, short of sacrificing the integrity of the Gospel and the honour of God. The candidate having promised this, the pastor, placing his right hand on the candidate's head, says, 'In view of your declaration and promise, and by virtue of the power which we exercise in the Reformed Church of France, as ministers of Christ' (here all the pastors rise and place their right hands on the candidate's head) 'in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, we confer on you by imposition of hands, according to apostolic use, the evangelical ministry within this Church, and we recognize you as entitled to fulfil regularly all the duties of this ministry, namely, the preaching of the Gospel, the Cure of Souls, the Ministry of the Sacraments, the instruction of youth, and the hallowing of marriage. May God give you grace to do this work as being accountable to Him, that when the Chief Shepherd shall appear,

you may receive a crown of glory. Amen.' Then follows a hymn invoking the Holy Spirit, after which the Blessing is given.

The prayer-book also contains an office for the installation of Elders and Deacons.

There is as yet no ministry of women other than that of parochial deaconesses, for whom there are several places of training.

Their missionaries go all over the world. This week's papers, for instance, contain accounts of the work of missionaries at Zambesi and in Melanesia.

A marked feature of present-day Protestantism is the Christian Social Movement, which interests itself greatly in the World Alliance of Christian Fellowship and was strongly represented in the Stockholm Conference. The review entitled *Le Christianisme Sociale* is the organ of the party. It has lately printed some striking articles on *La Valeur universelle du Christianisme*. Still more interesting to a student of the Reformed Church were articles on the search for a principle of authority in the Church. The writer praises the Lutheran local Consistories (or ruri-decanal chapters), with the district synod above them, and above that again the general synod, each with its dignitary to rule it.

In contrast to this, the Calvinist polity is pledged to the principles of parity of ministers, universal suffrage of the faithful, representative assemblies with legislative powers, and avoidance of clericalism. Nevertheless the chief of the parish is the pastor, and not the presbyteral council. In each church it is laid down that there shall be a Consistory composed of persons in authority, namely, the pastors and elders. But, says the writer, it is essential that the pastor should preside over this body, as in all ecclesiastical assemblies. Otherwise the pastor tends to become merely a paid servant, and the assembly is robbed of any distinctively religious character. The presidency of the pastor shows that spiritual considerations predominate over administrative ones. Under these circumstances it is right to fortify the presiding pastor by assigning him a presidency for life over an ecclesiastical senate, and to do this by impersonalizing him to a certain extent. Thus to-day the principle of parity of ministers begins to be questioned, and we see a movement which may result in a form of episcopacy.

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A pastor who intends to take an independent stand must be a man of force. The stipend, however, though assessed locally, has to be remitted to Paris, to which the congregation are responsible, and it is then sent to the pastor from the central authority for finance.

A great '*Réveil*,' or Call to Awake, is now being proclaimed in the Reformed Church. The message which the new *Réveil* seeks to bring before the Church is that of Solidarity. The disciples of Jesus are the members of His Body, and an organic solidarity reigns amongst them.

La Vie Nouvelle of 15th January, commenting on the activities of the Rector of St. Martin's-in-the-Field, and comparing them with those of Dr. Orchard, remarks that the Church and Nonconformity seem to be exchanging *rôles*. Speaking of the Anglo-Catholic party and the Free Catholics, the writer adds that they afford 'one more proof to what an extent the English mind is attracted by the beauty of outward forms of worship, on the one hand, and by the idea of a return to primitive unity on the other.'

The problem of religious education is as pressing for the Reformed Church as for ourselves. They speak of the *carence* of the secular school. It is a machine rolling over the soil of France to crush in the hearts of children any seeds of religious feeling. The suggested remedy is to multiply Sunday Schools and classes on Thursdays, when schools are shut. Another course is to endow schools for the maintenance of the Protestant Faith, similar to those of Catholics. There is a great opportunity for a church which can make the children of France into good men and good women.

I hope that these notes will develop sympathetic interest in a Church which is bound by ties of history to our own and, like ours, can boast her martyrs and her missionary labours—true marks of the Church.

Her work is constructive and positive, not a mere negation of Rome. Her temper is national and patriotic, far removed from that of the *poseurs* who trifle with a sentimental legitimism. Her continued existence is a standing proof that the Latin religious consciousness is not necessarily expressed in Papal religion. There is an alternative solution, combining fidelity to Christian tradition with courageous progress, and this the Churches of the Reformation collectively strive to embody.

DR. BROAD ON THE TRINITY

By the Rev. C. J. SHEBBEARE, M.A., Wilde Lecturer in Natural and Comparative Religion, Oxford.

THE article contributed by Dr. C. D. Broad to the October number of the *Hibbert Journal*, entitled 'The Validity of Belief in a Personal God,' deserves the study of every serious theologian. It raises on every page questions on which it would be good for us all to clear our minds. May I confine myself here to what Dr. Broad says of the Trinity?

Dr. Broad distinguishes 'God' in the popular, from 'God' in the theological, sense. He writes:

> 'A God, in the theological sense, need not be a person. According to orthodox Christian theology, nothing can strictly be called "God" except the Trinity as a whole. And the Trinity is certainly not a person. It is true that the Athanasian Creed says that the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God; but it immediately adds that nevertheless there are not three Gods, but one God. If these statements are to be rendered consistent, it is plain that the word "God" must be used in a different sense in the two. Nor is there the least difficulty in seeing what these two senses are. The creed means that there is only one being that can, with strict theological correctness, be called "God," *viz.* the Trinity as a whole. But each of the three persons can be called "God" in a looser sense, because they are divine persons and essential constituents of the Trinity, which is God in the strict sense. . . . The whole composed of them [the three persons] is a God, and is the only God that there is' (p. 37).

(1) Dr. Broad is here stating what he believes the Creed to *mean*. I venture then, first, to correct him on the question of fact. Dr. Broad may say 'This meaning which I attribute to the Creed-makers is the only *consistent* meaning which their words will bear. If this is not their meaning, their language is nonsensical and incoherent.' We will consider this argument presently. Meanwhile let us ask whether what Dr. Broad attributes to them was what those who framed and accepted the Creed really believed themselves to be saying. Is Dr. Broad at this point a correct interpreter of 'orthodox theology?'[1]

I should like to say, in advance, why I believe this question to be important. It is *prima facie* reasonable to suppose that in framing this doctrine theologians believed themselves to be stating something which had genuine significance for religion. At any rate we ought not to assume that at any stage theologians have been simply making the best of a nonsensical formula,

[1] *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, p. 43.

which meant nothing to them, though they felt themselves pledged by tradition to defend it. I have myself come to believe that (in spite of appearances to the contrary[2]) a consistent meaning can be given to the statements which Dr. Broad quotes from the Athanasian Creed: that these statements concern something really important: that they mean something very different from what Dr. Broad thinks. At the same time, I believe that if we are to show that there is a method of reducing them to consistency other than the simple and obvious one which Dr. Broad offers, we must take a path which some theologians will refuse to tread. His capacity to meet and correct Dr. Broad's statement, and to supply without embarrassment an account of what the Doctrine of the Trinity really means, is, I believe, a test of the value of a theologian's thought: and is the sort of test to which we all ought to be willing to submit.

Turn, then, to the question of fact. I find it hard to believe that anyone who had read much of the writings, either of the Fathers or of their successors, could come to the conclusion that they *meant* to apply the term 'God,' either to the Son or to the Father, in a 'looser sense' than that in which they applied it to the Trinity. If this had been their intention they would, among other things, have been lowering the traditional conception of the *Father*. 'The Jews,' they would have had to say, 'regard the Father as God in the strictest sense. *We*, as Trinitarians, regard the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ as God in a looser and lower sense. He is reduced to being the component part of a triple whole.' I do not profess to have read all the vast literature of this subject; but I have not found a single passage which would bear this interpretation.

On the other hand, there are many passages inconsistent with it.

Take, first, St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Thomas had the advantage of writing after the Lateran Council of 1215, when (as some would contend) the doctrine of the Trinity took its final form. 'The whole perfection of the divine nature,' he says,[3] 'is in each of the persons' (*tota perfectio divinae naturae est in*

[2] The story of the boy who complained that while in the arithmetic lesson he was taught that 'three times one make three,' in the divinity class he learnt that 'three times one make one,' should be told to every Candidate for Confirmation.

[3] Summa Theol., I, xlii, 4 *concl. ad tertium.*

qualibet personarum). *Magnitudo in divinis*—he had just before said—*significat perfectionem naturae et ad essentiam pertinet. Eadem est essentia et dignitas Patris et Filii, sed in Patre est secundum relationem dantis, in Filio secundum relationem accipientis.*[4] Again, *Tantus est Pater quanta tota Trinitas*,[5] *i.e.*, as 'great' in relation to perfection and dignity. This phrase is used in answer to those who argue that the categories of 'whole' and 'part' must be applied to God. *Si in Deo*—they had said —*sit numerus personarum, erit in Deo ponere totum et partem.*[6]

Similar language is used—in spite of its *prima facie* appearance of self-contradictoriness—both earlier and later.

In the Fathers we have the well-known comparisons between the relation of the Father to the Son on the one hand, and the relation of 'a flame to its light,' of the 'spring to the stream,' of a 'seal to its impress' on the other. 'Think,' says St. Augustine,[7] 'of fire as a father, light as a son. See, we have found coevals. The moment fire comes into existence, it forthwith begets light. . . . And if we ask which genders which, your commonsense tells you immediately.'

Again it is said that, somewhat in the same way as the fountain sends on water to the stream, so the Father passes on the divine nature to the Son.[8]

The significance of these comparisons—which the Fathers are careful to say are not exact—is clearly to teach, first, that the whole divine nature or essence is in each of the Three Persons —the impress is a *full* reproduction of the character of the seal, the stream is 'just water' as is the spring,[9] the flame is conceived as fully expressed in the light and heat it throws out— and, secondly, that the divine persons are inseparable.[10] 'The

[4] Greatness here signifies perfection of Nature and belongs to essence. The essence and dignity of the Father and of the Son is the same, but is in the Father according to the relation of Giver, in the Son according to the relation of Receiver. xlii, 4, *concl. ad secundum.*

[5] The Father is as great as is the whole Trinity. No. xxx, art. I, *ad quartum.* [6] xxx, i, 4.

[7] *Sermo ad Catechumenos*, § 8. See Heurtley's *De Fide et Symbolo*, p. 111, and his *On Faith and the Creed*, p. 42.

[8] Augustine, *De Fide et Symbolo*, § 17, cp. § 4. 'God when he begat the Word begat what He Himself is' (*Deus, cum Verbum genuit, id quod est ipse genuit*). *cf.* § 6. *Id existens quod Pater est, Deus de Deo.*

[9] Do. § 17. We might speak of having a 'perfect impression' of a seal: and yet to have the seal itself would be to possess more.

[10] Do. § 4. *Ubi semper inseparabilis fuit Pater a filio, Filius a Patre, potuerunt ambo esse nisi unus Deus?*

moment the fire comes into existence, it forthwith begets light.' Thus, to use Gibbon's language, we are dealing both with a 'generical unity' and with a 'numerical unity.'

It is not to be forgotten that, side by side with this language declaring that both Father and Son are in the full sense God, there is other language (not *intended* to be inconsistent with the former) which may fairly be paraphrased as stating that the Son is 'necessary to the completeness of the Godhead.' The Son—we are told—is not 'external' to the Father,[11] does not 'accrue' to the Father from without. He is 'of the Substance of the Father,' 'of the Father.' If—it is argued—the Son were not eternal, the Father would not always be Father; and this absence of Fatherhood, it is implied, would be a defect.

Of similar effect is the argument of St. Thomas, that 'although angels and holy souls are always with God, yet if there was in the Godhead no plurality of persons it would follow that God was solitary.'[12] In the preceding article[13] he has said that the name 'solitary' is to be avoided *ne tollatur consortium trium personarum.*[14] We need not, perhaps, read into this phrase all that it might imply in a modern writer.[15] But at least the absence of *consortium* is regarded as entailing a lack of completeness.

It is easy to find modern statements parallel to all these quotations from ancient and medieval writers. Commenting on the passage in which Athanasius asserts that 'it is all one to say that God is "wholly participated in" and that He "begets,"' the Oxford Edition of the *Library of the Fathers* (1842)[16] speaks of the 'strict unity of the Divine Substance' and remarks that 'when it is said that the First Person of the Holy Trinity communicates divinity to the Second, it is meant that that one essence which is the Father also is the Son.'[17]

[11] Athan. Discourse I, Chap. V.

[12] S.T. Pt. I, XXXI, 3, *concl. ad primum.*

[13] XXXI, 2 concl. It is worth while to compare the second objection in art. 3 with its answer.

[14] Lest we take away the 'fellowship' of the three persons.

[15] XXXI, 2 concl. *Hoc nomen 'alius' masculine sumptum non importat nisi distinctionem suppositi.*

[16] VIII, p. 203.

[17] *Cf.* the quotation in S.T. Pt. I., XXXI, 2, of Augustine's: *Una est essentia Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti in qua non est aliud Pater, aliud Filius, aliud Spiritus Sanctus, quamvis personaliter sit alius Pater, alius Filius, alius Spiritus Sanctus.*

One of the most illuminating passages in the *Summa* on this subject is in Pt. I, XXXI, art. 3, ad secundum. 'Non proprie dici potest *Pater est*

Thus, whatever difficulties this use of language may present, it runs through the history of Trinitarian theology. Professor Webb has given references to the Fourth Lateran Council, to John of Damascus, to Turretinus, to show that the Western Church, the Eastern Church, and the Churches of the Reformation, have concurred in the view that 'in each person of the Trinity the whole Divine Nature is expressed.'[18]

(2) So much, then, for the historical facts. Let us now face this paradox to which Theology seems to have committed itself. Dr. Broad's attempt to reduce the Athanasian Creed to self-consistency breaks down. Orthodox theology, on its own showing, means to say something which has a greater appearance of inconsistency than has the comparatively mild doctrine of a God composed of three ingredients. Is there, then, any real consistency beneath the apparent contradictions?

The paradox may be summed up in one sentence: 'The Father is as great as the whole Trinity.'[19] *Tantus est pater quanta tota Trinitas.* In spite of what he says about 'part' and 'whole,' St. Thomas is here constrained to speak of the 'whole Trinity.' Does he affirm, then, that the part is as great as the whole? Is he, in fact, contradicting himself shamelessly?

I do not think that Dr. Broad would readily come to the conclusion that Christian Theology is a wilful mystification, though he has done well to show us that it has often been made to look as if it were. Dr. Broad has told us elsewhere that 'to persons who know nothing of the theological controversies which preceded the formulation of the Athanasian Creed the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity is unintelligible.'[20] But to

solus Deus vel *Trinitas est solus Deus* nisi forte ex parte praedicati intelligatur aliqua implicatio, ut dicatur *Trinitas est Deus qui est solus Deus.* Et secundum hoc etiam posset esse vera ista *Pater est Deus qui est solus Deus'*: i.e. we may not say that the Trinity is, in Dr. Broad's phrase, 'the only God there is,' for it is true also to say that 'the Father is God.' But we *may* say that 'the Trinity'—or 'the Father'—is 'God and that there is only one God.' When St. Augustine uses language rather like Dr. Broad's—and says *Patrem non esse solum Deum* sed *Trinitatem esse solum Deum*—St. Thomas is careful to explain that he is speaking *expositive, i.e.* that his meaning is that the *particular passage he is expounding* refers to the Trinity.

[18] See *God and Personality*, p. 69, note. *Unaquaeque persona habet totam divinitatem.* Cf. Aug. (De F. et S. § 4). *Deus Pater . . . hoc ad seipsum indicandum genuit quod est ipse qui genuit.*

[19] S.T. Pt. I, xxx, art 1, *concl. ad quartum.*

[20] *Scientific Thought*, p. 215, *cf.* pp. 93, 156.

understand the doctrine fully we must, I venture to think, go further back than Dr. Broad has done. We must know not merely what the heretics said and what the Church answered: we must understand the religious feelings of devotion and piety by which that answer was dictated. Briefly, the doctrine grew up because Christians found that, at the very moment when they were contending to the death for Monotheism, they were themselves worshipping Christ. On reflection they were sure that they *ought* to worship Christ. They therefore sought intellectual justification for doing so. Whether the doctrine of the Trinity affords this justification is not now our question. We are not now asking whether they were right: but what they meant, and whether their meaning was self-consistent. We are examining the charge—very often and very pardonably brought against theology—that, whether it knows it or not, it is talking sheer nonsense.

Can the paradox, then, which seems to equate one member of the Trinity with the whole be explained in the light of Christian *worship?* Religious emotion is no excuse for making contradictory statements. But perhaps an understanding of this emotion may serve to show that religion means by its statements something less obviously contradictory than it appears to mean when we look at it coldly from outside.

When the writer of a modern hymn says 'Thou, O Christ, art all I want,' he presumably means *something;* and yet clearly he does not mean to declare his independence of the other persons of the Trinity—to assert the needlessness of the Father, the superfluity of the Holy Ghost.

The worship of Christ—someone may say—is in a great measure erotic. It is the successor to Pagan cults. Its statements, then, have no more metaphysical significance than the hyperbolic utterances of a lover. But, though in religion we ought always to be on the look-out for morbid developments, Christian worship in the main is not morbid. The worship of the average singer of Christian hymns is not even mystical. It is predominantly ethical. The normal Christian seldom quite forgets the text, 'If ye love Me, keep My commandments.'

In other words, Christian worship in its commonest form 'identifies' Christ with the Law He enjoins, with the Ideal He presents. To follow His Law and to follow *Him* are one and

the same thing. Christian worship is admittedly hypocritical except on the assumption that the worshipper is seriously trying to 'take Christ's yoke upon him.'

It is this 'identification' of Christ with the Ideal of Holiness which He puts before us which alone gives the real explanation of our ascription to Him of Divinity. Dr. Broad speaks of 'God in the strict sense.' What *is* the strict sense of this term?

God has been defined as the *ens realissimum*, as the 'Creator and Supreme Governor of the World,' as 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived.' But these are purely philosophical definitions. It is a step towards the phraseology which is congenial to religion when the last of the above definitions is replaced by the phrase that 'God is so good a thing that there can be no better.' It is a still further step when the Psalmist says, 'My soul is athirst for God,' and so suggests as a definition that 'God is that which would satisfy the whole thirst (or, if we prefer it, the deepest thirst) of man's soul.'

'We mean by God,' said a distinguished philosopher lately, 'that which we can and must worship'; and no one surely could reject the definition that 'God is the supreme object of our reverence and homage'—is that which 'has an absolute claim upon our obedience.' These phrases imply that we think of God as 'making a demand' upon us. But surely, so far as God is a term of *religion*, this is just what this notion of God involves.

(3) In the light of this definition the paradox will perhaps appear less paradoxical. Turn again to the facts about worship.

The late Dean Rashdall—on hearing of someone who had said that to worship Jesus was as much idolatry as to worship Socrates—replied quietly, 'I do not feel that.' The continued worship of Christ in spite of theological revolutions—the Reformation, the dawn of Liberalism—is a remarkable fact. Men worship Jesus as they would feel it frankly absurd to worship Socrates or St. Paul or St. Francis. To worship these or other heroes is an impulse which every generous soul has felt. But conscience forbids us to make the worship absolute. We can almost worship St. Francis. Yet in some points he lies open to our just criticism. If many men feel about Jesus that conscience does *not* forbid an absolute homage to *Him*, this is a fact to be taken into account. This worship implies, of course, certain highly disputable beliefs: first, that the distinctive

moral standard of Christianity is the absolute moral standard; secondly, that the central figure of the Gospel stories is a consistent and adequate embodiment of that standard; thirdly, that that figure was in all essential traits drawn from life. Dr. Broad may deny every one of those beliefs. But we are concerned here, not with the justification of Christian belief, but merely with its statement and explanation.

What chiefly demands notice, then, is that 'identification' (already mentioned) of Jesus with the Ideal He presents. To 'obey Him'[21] and to 'obey the Gospel'[22] are one and the same act. The soul, quickened to a sense of guilt under Christian teaching, finds—in spite of the imperfection of its own performance—'rest' in 'taking His yoke.' It is this sense of the 'adequacy of Jesus to His own teaching,' as other teachers are not adequate to theirs, which explains how the worship of Christ was possible to a man so predominantly and clear-headedly ethical as the late Dean of Carlisle.

This identification of the Call of Duty with the Call of Christ might be compared with the identification of the Call of one's Country and the Call of one's King. But in the latter case the identification is temporary and accidental. Christ, on the other hand, has produced on His followers the impression that He is in a different position from all other men: that whereas no one understood better than He how to show men the need of repentance, He shows no sign of having ever needed to repent Himself.

In this whole view of Christ there are implied, of course, both moral and historical judgments. Every great historical character demands from us a certain 'reaction.' We ought to react to his influence in some determinate way—whether by assent, or submission, or admiration, or tolerance, or hostility, or contempt. The peculiarity of Jesus is that He has produced on some men in every century since He lived the impression that to give themselves to Him or to give themselves to the service of the Moral Law were identical acts. Whether this impression be right or wrong, it shows what the worship of Jesus has usually meant. It has meant that our right reaction to Him is the reaction of absolute submission.

But if we worship Jesus as the embodiment of the Ideal of

[21] *Hebrews*, 5, 9. [22] I *Peter*, 4, 17; II *Thess.*, 1, 8.

Holiness, is it not clear that the *primary* object of our worship is that Ideal itself? This question is not often asked. Yet on reflection the answer is plain. We should, on the one hand, never dream of worshipping a God who did *not* embody this Ideal. We should refuse to worship Jupiter—however self-existent, omnipotent, or omniscient he might be. On the other hand, if we believed in Morality but not in God, if we thought that the Moral Law and the Ideal therein involved had no complete embodiment, we should still treat this Ideal as demanding our absolute submission. Kant's attitude towards the Moral Law—which 'humbles' and 'commands' him—has all the distinctive characterstics of worship.[23] We may prefer to speak of the 'Ideal of Holiness.' The 'Moral Law' has, for many of us, associations with the Policeman or the Pharisee. But the Moral Law, as Kant understands it, is just that which claims our absolute obedience throughout life. It is not too much to say that it is the Moral Law which claims our whole allegiance, which (speaking of itself) says to us 'Thou shalt have none other gods but Me.'

If, then, Jesus is God in the sense that His will can be identified with the Moral Law, this is the highest sense—indeed, the only true sense—in which Godhead can be predicated of anyone. What higher claim could be made for anyone than to say 'His will demands the same absolute reverence as man owes to the Moral Law'? But again, what else but such intrinsic holiness entitles anyone to be called God? Thus self-existence and omnipotence, without holiness, would not be divine attributes at all.

But, further, if Jesus is God in this sense there is no longer anything particularly paradoxical in saying (if we happen to believe in the Trinity) that Jesus is *tantus quanta tota trinitas*. The 'greatness' which worship and moral reverence recognise is not quantitative or divisible. If the Ideal of Holiness is personally embodied in Jesus, it is none the *less* an object of reverence because it is thus personally embodied. If to us its call

[23] Cf. the late Prof. Cook Wilson's *Statement and Inference*, p. 862: 'We speak of reverence for the moral law: but . . . I believe that no such feeling is possible for a mere formula.' This most important book had not appeared when the present article was written. I can only reply, with the utmost respect, that I *know* that reverence is possible for a 'formula' when that formula is the Moral Law.

and His call are one, we shall honour Him as we honour it. But again, it is none the *more* an object of reverence because it is personally expressed. Our reverence for it is absolute, whether it exists in a personal embodiment or not. Only the man who is blind to the absolute claims of duty—or has not thought out what they imply—can have any serious doubt on this head. Thus we may rejoice that the Ideal of Holiness is expressed not only in the life and teaching of Jesus: but also in that inward impulse—which we call the Spirit—which presses it upon the gradual recognition of mankind. Further, we may rejoice in the belief (if we hold it) that this Ideal, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, is expressing itself in the Universe at large. That is, we may rejoice in the sort of beliefs which are associated with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit and with the doctrine of the Creative Father. But we may do this, quite consistently, at the very moment in which we are saying of Jesus 'Thou, O Christ, art all I want.' If I so read the character of Jesus that He seems to me to embody the Moral Law—*not in the sense that He had explicity faced all our modern problems, but in the sense that His temper and ultimate moral principles are fundamentally the right temper and the right principles, so that He has expressed the absolute truth on the most important of all subjects*—then it is intelligible if I simply identify its command and His, if for me the claim of Holiness upon me and the call of Jesus addressed to me are one and the same call. The Moral Law—the Christian's Ideal of Holiness—is the supreme, and in a sense the sole, object of my reverence. My whole life ought to be at its sole command. For those who understand the 'identification' described above, it will be clear how—not in any erotic or mystical sense, but in a manner entirely rational and Kantian—the Holy One of the Gospels[24] *satisfies* the thirst of the soul which is athirst for *God*.

The sketch, in the preceding paragraph, of Trinitarian faith is of course incomplete. It is especially important to state explicitly that the embodiment of the Ideal of Holiness in Jesus and in the inner life of man are not to be regarded as sporadic manifestations, but as parts of one connected scheme. But the statement, though incomplete, is true. This conception of Jesus, of the Spirit, of the Universe, has been a great part of what the

[24] *Grundlegung*, p. 408.

doctrine of the Trinity has been meant to express. In general, it is true that Christians all through the ages have been much more like in mind to Dean Rashdall than to the worshippers of Thammuz. This remark is entirely relevant to what I take to be the real meaning of Dr. Broad's view—namely, that Christian theology is either nonsensical or barbaric.

(4) In sum, then, I am contending that the paradox[25] which makes 'one person as great as the whole Trinity' looks less paradoxical if we frankly recognize that the ascription of deity to anyone or anything is primarily a judgment of value. But if this is the right defence, then surely some of the usual language of the pulpit ought to be abandoned. My friend Dr. Leighton Pullan is reported to have said that to allege that 'Christ had the value of God' or to say that 'a perfect man is the same thing as God in His Godhead,' or again, that 'in the language of devotion we can legitimately pray to Christ even if we do not believe that His person was eternal and fully divine' were 'demoralizing subterfuges.' This appears to imply that our right to worship Christ depends not on a judgment about His holiness, but on a judgment about His *eternal existence*: and I say frankly that if anyone affirms such a view, I feel it hard to believe that he has thought out what he is saying. If Dr. Pullan had come into contact with Jesus as Peter did, and if further it had come into his mind to use such language of adoration as is attributed to the apostle Thomas, I don't believe for a moment that he would have resisted this impulse of worship till the Master had given him an assurance of His own eternity. I do him the credit to believe that he would have fallen on his knees at once, and would have left the questions of eternity and pre-existence till afterwards. This is not to say that these questions are unimportant, nor is it to suggest a negative answer. But it is, at any rate, in accordance with orthodoxy to declare that in the earthly life of Jesus His divine glory was revealed—we read not 'The Word was made flesh and we have been *led to believe* that behind what we saw the divine glory lay hid,' but 'We have *seen* His glory'—and wherever the full glory of God is revealed, is it not there and then to be worshipped?

[25] It is perhaps worth while to point out that the King and the House of Commons, which Dr. Broad mentions, not merely go to *compose* the Constitution. Each in a certain connexion *embodies* it.

Surely we can all think of much better reasons for worshipping Jesus than for worshipping the 'eternal' or the 'self-existent' *as such*. Does mere self-existence give any claim to moral homage? If I thought that matter was self-existent or eternal, I should not worship it: and to the average religious man holiness is a much more intelligible conception than either eternity or self-existence.

The question which I imagine to be at issue between Dr. Pullan and myself is not whether Jesus is to be worshipped, nor whether He is to be worshipped with the most absolute and unqualified homage which can be conceived, nor whether the Second Person of the Trinity is eternal, but simply and solely what is an adequate *ground* for worship of this unqualified kind. Therefore I put the matter in a form in which I believe that many of the younger generation of Anglo-Catholic theologians will agree that it is fair to put it. If I believed that anyone, however eternal and self-existent he might be, were devoid of the temper and principles which seem to me to characterize Jesus of Nazareth, I should refuse to worship him. If, on the other hand, I thought that Jesus had no existence before or after His earthly life, I should still feel Him to be worthy of my unqualified homage.

Would not Dr. Pullan make the same refusal and render the same homage? I venture to say—in spite of his language about 'demoralizing subterfuges'—that I believe that he would.

JESUS AND THE RESURRECTION

WHAT did Jesus teach about the Resurrection? We have the answer to that question in His dialogue with the Sadducees, preserved in *Mark* xii, 18-27, and parallels in *Matthew* and *Luke*. To understand the significance of that answer, we must understand the mental background which lay behind that discourse of Jesus with the Sadducees. This background consisted of certain ideas about a resurrection embedded in Jewish apocalyptic. These ideas, briefly stated, were that when the Messiah came, there would be a resurrection of the material (physical) body of all faithful departed Jews wherever dispersed: subterranean tunnels were to be made by God by which they might make the journey to Palestine: all would rise in the same clothes, and with the same deformities

(if any) that they had had in their earlier life on earth : they were to possess their former bodily passions and appetites : would eat, drink, and marry. Even the problem put to Jesus for His solution by the Sadducees had already been settled—the woman was to be the wife of her first husband.

The passage in the Law which Jesus used in order to confute the Sadducees on their own ground, for the Sadducees acknowledged only the Law amongst the Old Testament scriptures as authoritative, was, 'I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob,' which Jesus interprets in such a way as to teach that an eternal life for man is inherent in both the nature of God, as eternally God, and also inherent in the nature of man as God's child—the One (the Father) is immortal, the other (His child) must therefore be immortal too—the immortality of the One involved the immortality of the other; for it is of the very essence of a child to partake of the nature of its father. The argument of Jesus, *per se*, is unimpeachable. It was this interpretation that astonished and confused the Sadducees. It was new to them. To us it is the more important because, in association with it, Jesus sets His seal also to a resurrection life. No Christian will dispute this. But, so far as the writer knows, this is as far as Christian exegesis has gone in connexion with this discourse. But this exegesis leaves us with another question to solve, namely, *when* is this resurrection to take place? The object of this brief article is to suggest that this discourse gives us the clue to this also. It is, then, suggested that when Jesus uttered the words, 'But, that the dead are raised,' He meant what He said; and that therefore Abraham, Isaac and Jacob were already 'raised,' as an accomplished fact.

But before we deal with the actual words of Jesus, let us look at the discourse itself, as a whole.

Jesus clearly had a two-fold object in view: first, to substantiate belief in a future life (the minor point), and secondly, to teach that the resurrection life is not subject to the materialistic conditions of the present earthly life (the major point). The Sadducees denied the first, and could not conceive of the second. *In the abstract*, these two points are quite distinct—the former not necessarily involving the latter; for, theoretically, the soul could, after physical death, go on living in an 'intermediate state' between death and the resurrection of the body, This, of course, is the traditional view to-day. But can we legitimately

deduce it from the discourse itself? To the writer it appears that we cannot. The utmost that can be deduced from the words, 'I am the God of Abraham,' etc. (taken by themselves), is a substantiation of faith in the minor point, namely, a future life: and this is all that Jesus Himself (as a first step) deduced from them, 'He is not the God of the dead, but of the living: for all live unto Him'—the minor point. But these words (of themselves) have no bearing whatever on the major point, taken apart from the earlier statement of Jesus, 'That the dead are raised.'

Now, whatever Jesus meant by the words, 'the dead are raised,' no one will dispute that, by them, He linked up the major point with the minor. But, we ask, what bearing, if any, have the words on the *when* of this resurrection? The Greek word for 'are raised' is ἐγείρονται, and is precisely the same word, and in the same tense, as Jesus used when He sent back John the Baptist's disciples with the message, 'The dead are raised,' that is, are brought to life again after death. And only in this sense does the discourse under consideration, as a whole, hang together, or become of any logical validity for the two-fold purpose involved in it. If we suppose 'the dead are raised' to refer to something which *would be done in the future*, we throw the whole discourse into logical confusion. How could Jesus (or indeed anyone) appeal to something in the past *which had never happened* to prove something which would happen in the future—a non-entity to prove a future entity? If the Patriarchs had not been raised, why appeal to them in order to substantiate the general fact? If Jesus had had a *future* resurrection in mind, would He not have said, 'That the dead *will be raised*'?

The interpretation just given comes out more forcibly when we review the context to St. Luke's account of John the Baptist's sending his disciples to Jesus. There we see that Jesus had just raised the widow's son of Nain; and that this was the crowning act that induced John to send them. Jesus sends them back with the words, 'The dead *are* raised' (ἐγείρονται). It was an accomplished fact.

Again, Jesus, speaking of those who '*are* accounted worthy to attain to that world (αἰῶν) and the resurrection of the dead,' said that they 'are' (not shall be) 'sons of God, being sons of the resurrection.' Jesus here couples both major and minor points together. 'Sons of the resurrection' means '*partakers* of

the resurrection.' The word 'are' in connexion with these events still connotes an accomplished fact. Are we, then, to wait, after death, for some indefinitely 'far-off divine event' before we can be accounted worthy to attain to 'that world' and become partakers of the resurrection? Such a view again throws the discourse into logical confusion, and also contradicts much of the most explicit teaching of Jesus. And do we not hope to be 'accounted worthy to attain to that world' when we die?

But the same feature ('the dead *are* raised') also comes out in the account of our Lord's Transfiguration. We are there told that Moses and Elijah appeared. They could hardly have done this if they were disembodied spirits awaiting the resurrection. Clearly they had been 'clothed upon with their habitation which was from heaven,' and, 'being clothed, were not found naked,' disembodied: they *were* 'sons of the resurrection.' And, moreover, they appeared to be familiar with much, concerning which they could have known nothing when on earth, and were also acquainted with what was then going on on earth, and also with what was about to go on. And why should it be otherwise with us? Why should we have to wait, in a disembodied state, before we can go permanently forward?

Throughout the entire discourse Jesus seems to have regarded the fact of a resurrection from the standpoint of something continually going on, which at death becomes an accomplished fact for each individual—past, present, and to come. The tense of the verbs He uses, as also the logical interpretation of the discourse, seems to justify this interpretation.

Jewish apocalyptic ideas permeated the minds of both Jews and Christians in apostolic days, and these ideas largely determined the interpretation the disciples and their converts put on the teaching of Jesus about the future life, and this interpretation became incorporated into Christian theology. This Christian theology thus appears to be based, not so much on the eschatological teaching of Jesus Himself (which it would seem the disciples did not understand) as upon survivals of the apocalyptic heritage brought into the Christian Church by the disciples and other Jewish Christians. And can we not feel convinced that the interpretation of the Resurrection given in this article is the true one, and would have been that of Christian theology from the first but for apocalyptic preconceptions?

HENRY J. ALLEN.

BOOK REVIEWS

ESSAYS OF DISTINCTION.*

This volume consists of eleven studies of great Christians by as many writers. All the essayists are Ministers of the Wesleyan Methodist Church, and the studies have been chosen as illustrations of the essential unity of Christian experience, proofs of what Christ has meant and can mean to men of differing types and circumstances.

The witnesses cited range in time from Clement of Alexandria to Francis Paget, and in variety of temper and upbringing from St. Augustine, St. Teresa and J. H. Newman to Gerard Groote, Bunyan and George Fox.

Opinions will differ, but personally we should select for special commendation Mr. Flew's essay on Clement, Mr. Chapman's on St. Augustine, Mr. Bateman's on Pascal, and Mr. Robson's on Fox, while affirming that Mr. Handley Jones' study of Newman of itself renders the permanent possession of the book a virtual necessity.

Viewing the volume as a whole, we are struck first of all by the intellectual ability of the several essays. We frankly doubt whether eleven parochial clergymen of the Church of England, working, as these essayists are working, in the great centres of population, could have produced a similar volume of equal calibre.

Again, readers will at once be conscious of a distinction of style, a careful restraint of utterance and, in Mr. Flew's case perhaps pre-eminently, a charm of diction, which add greatly to the attractiveness of the book. In many Anglican minds there still lingers the impression of a Methodist as one whose speech is somewhat emotional, florid, perfervid, characterised rather by oratorical energy than by grace of expression or by literary merit. A study of these essays will go far to remove that impression by affording clear proof that it is ill founded.

We notice further a remarkable catholicity of spirit, an informed and sympathetic understanding of points of view far removed from those of conventional Nonconformity, a clear grasp of the fundamental unity of Christians in comparison with which merely denominational barriers appear flimsy and of small account. The Anglican temper as exhibited by Newman in his earlier days, by Gladstone, by Francis Paget, is sympathetically treated, and we count it no slight merit thus fairly to estimate the contribution of men outside the Free Churches to the common stock of Christian thought and experience.

But most important of all is the striking testimony borne by the essayists to the unchanging significance of Jesus Christ. They never 'preach.' Pious platitudes, and denominational catchwords are conspicuous by their absence. Yet one and all say frankly and fearlessly what Christ has meant to them as well as to the great men of the past whose lives they have elected to study. In reading this book Modernists will discover that men no less eager for truth, no less impatient of cant and emotionalism than themselves, have yet learned to state simply, constructively and with a sincerity as natural as it is rare, the great essentials of a Christocentric and dynamic faith.

One is tempted to quote at length from individual essays, but a few extracts must suffice. And these are given in the hope that they will induce those who read them to acquire and study the volume for themselves.

**Eleven Christians: Studies in Personality.* By Members of the Fellowship of the Kingdom. (S.C.M., 1925. Pp. 246. Price 5/-.)

Take, for example, this from Mr. Flew's essay on Clement. Clement, he tells us, 'had seen Christ in the hearts and minds of men before His day. He had seen a God who had spoken through Greek Philosophy, as well as through the words of the Hebrew Lawgiver. He had seen One Who spoke in the loveliest poetry of the past, Whose word was manifest in all the fragments of truth that had been given to the world, Whose reason illuminated the minds of all seekers after reality. Christ had been from the beginning of the world the great Lover of mankind.'

Or this from Mr. Chapman's essay on Augustine. 'He was a great sceptic and a great man of faith. His ideas flash into burning passions, and the intensity of his passion gives immense driving power to his ideas. He had the genius which puts facts into a large context, and he asked of life big questions and got big answers.'

Of the crisis of Pascal's search after reality Mr. Bateman writes: 'No longer was truth apprehended simply as an intellectual proposition, but as an experience such as Wesley speaks of, "a certitude not that God is, but that He is in me," or Bunyan's "Christ was a precious Christ to my soul that night; I could scarce lie in my bed for joy and peace and triumph through Christ."'

Students of the life of George Fox, and their number might well be larger, will find much that is of interest in Mr. Robson's sympathetic essay. Perhaps more can be said for the possession by Fox of a sense of humour than the essayist is willing to allow. Certainly Fox's strenuous opposition to what the Quakers termed 'hat-honour' is no proof of its absence. And the fact that Fox, as Mr. Robson himself tells us, could sit in silence on a haystack for some hours in the presence of an expectant multitude, in order 'to famish them from words,' is an indication that on occasion at any rate his humour could express itself in very trenchant disguise.

The utter sincerity of Fox is well illustrated by the following. He saw, says Mr. Robson, 'that there were many folk giving an easy, complacent assent to statements about spiritual reality which, if true, should have shaken them to their very bones.' And the man's grip on the challenging social implications of the Christian creed is shown by the comment that 'he accepted the Father and the family, and the family complications so inevitable in a world like this. He was joined therefore to all men in a new bond of understanding and sympathy, and could not cut himself off from anything in God's creation. . . . He was never divided so as to be at one time just a religious revivalist, at another just a moralist, at another just a political or social reformer. He was always "a man in Christ," who saw the divine pattern, and saw it broken everywhere by the greed and fear and hardness of men.'

Of Mr. Handley Jones's essay on Newman we have already expressed appreciation. Short as it is, the essay by its effective characterisation of men and parties leaves on the mind a vivid impression both of Newman himself and the environment in which he played his part.

Of the Oxford Movement Mr. Jones writes with charity and discrimination. After the Evangelical Revival, he tells us, 'a catholic revival of some sort was perhaps inevitable. . . . It would be absolutely unjust to dismiss it as nothing more than a revival of formalism. The Tractarians were themselves debtors to the Evangelical Revival, and in returning to the catholic ideal they carried back that quickened personal consciousness which was the kernel of evangelical religion.'

The anti-dogmatic, cocksure temper of the age is well described. 'The old awe, the sense of mystery which makes the will irresolute, was blown away; life had become intelligible, and men felt themselves equal to its

demands. . . . In their scheme of things there was really no place for the soul. They were concerned only about the plain realities which lie on the surface of human experience. . . . They trusted the evidence of their senses and made on attempt to see the invisible. The Church recognised her enemy.'

But the Church as it was before the Catholic Revival was ill fitted for aggressive policies. 'The two chief schools of religious thought had both seen better days; the high churchmen being a little decayed in spirit, living on their past, and with difficulty keeping up a threadbare dignity in a world that showed them scant respect; while the evangelicals had outlived their great creative period and were rather at ease in Zion, flabby-minded and somewhat unctuous. Neither of them was in a position to meet a resolute opponent on equal terms.'

Finally, of Newman and his early associates Mr. Jones writes: 'They were "learning to hate before daring to love. . . ." They met "the march of mind" with battle-songs, songs that rang with defiant faith and smote the affirmations of the soul across the face of scepticism,' songs 'typical of the temper of Newman's mind in its militancy and consecration, pure and fierce like flame, and the essentially lyrical quality of its religious faith.'

We wish this beautiful and challenging volume a success of the kind which its authors would themselves desire for it, since it is dedicated *ad majorem Dei gloriam et in usum Christi servorum.*

W. Maurice Pryke.

SONGS OF PRAISE.*

Critical Notes on the Music.

A noteworthy feature of the music of this book is that no tune is printed twice, and there are also many alternative tunes.

Six tunes, designated 'Choir Songs,' have been included for the use of the choir only.

The best of all the well-known hymns seem to be included; many tunes which are too little known are added, and some twenty-nine tunes have been composed specially for this book—most of these new tunes are settings to extracts of classical poems which the Editors have very happily selected. Some of these poems must have created difficulties, chiefly metrical, for the composers of the tunes. Take, for example, the second line of the last verse of 'When through the whirl of Wheels' (Studdert-Kennedy), which runs 'God in a workman's jacket as before.' No amount of ingenuity on the part of a composer could eliminate the ugliness of *such* a line. The chief tunes worthy of mention are Holst's 'O Valiant Hearts' (Cartwright), Martin Shaw's 'All the past we leave behind' (Whitman), Somervell's 'When wilt thou save thy people?' (E. Elliott), and Vaughan Williams's 'England arise' (Carpenter). There is also a fascinating Irish melody arranged for O'Shaughnessy's 'Music Makers.' We are glad to see that Martin Shaw's setting of 'Jerusalem' (Blake) has been included as well as his 'Battle Hymn' (Julia Ward Howe); the old tune for this, 'John Brown's Body,' has also been included, though cautiously marked 'For secular use'!

We are also glad to see Martin Shaw's setting to Tennyson's 'Crossing the Bar' and Goss's well-known arrangement of 'Praise, my Soul.' One new tune of unique charm is Dr. Ernest Bullock's setting of Sir Edmund Gosse's poem 'Pilgrims'; the rhythm is free and the melody is particularly interesting.

**Songs of Praise with Tunes.* (Oxford University Press, 1925. Price 6/- net.)

How many of these new tunes will arrest the sympathy or even the interest of the average congregation it would be difficult to predict. Congregational hymn practices, which in any case are commendable, will be absolutely necessary if these tunes are to be given the place they deserve in the services.

In their bold weeding out of mawkish and sentimental tunes, the Editors have eliminated, we are sorry to note, such tunes as those which appear in the English Hymnal to 'Brightest and Best,' 'Just as I am,' 'God is working His purpose out,' 'Come, let us join our cheerful songs.' But on the other hand we welcome gladly new tunes for 'Fight the good fight,' 'For ever with the Lord,' 'Crown Him with many crowns,' 'I heard the voice of Jesus say,' 'Jesus shall reign,' 'God be with you,' etc.

The convenience of the congregation has been taken into consideration and the tunes are set at a reasonably low pitch. The upper limit is E, except in a very few cases where the tunes have a wide compass.

The pace and style are indicated by words, not by the usual metronomic indications. These indications, however, are capable of a liberal interpretation—*e.g.* University (the tune for 'The God of Love my Shepherd is') loses much of its charm when sung as indicated, 'moderately fast.' If the full beauty of the melody is to be appreciated—especially when the faux-bourdon is being sung—the pace should be fairly slow.

The arrangements of plainsong melodies are very pleasing. Two accompaniments are provided for each tune—the one contains the whole melody as sung, and the other, printed on a smaller stave above the treble stave, is specially suitable for certain verses which might be sung by boys' voices only.

A very notable feature of the hymn book is the inclusion of a number of descants and faux-bourdons.

At the beginning of the book there are useful notes on how to sing plainsong, and, at the end, a table of hymns arranged for the Sundays and Holy Days throughout the year. H.H.B.

THE ETHICS OF BIRTH-CONTROL.*

We can heartily recommend the Report of the Special Committee appointed by the National Council of Public Morals in connection with the investigations of the National Birth-rate Commission. The Report contains an Introduction by the Bishop of Winchester, the President of the National Council. Besides the Report of the Council there are contained in the same volume very valuable statements by Lord Dawson of Penn, Professor Carnegie Simpson, Bishop Gore, the Hon. Bertrand Russell, Mr. Harold Cox (Editor of the *Edinburgh Review*), and others. Birth-control is closely connected with the problems of eugenics and the rising tide of colour, and is subordinate to them. Nevertheless for the married, or those who contemplate marriage, it is an important question. This book seems to provide the proper kind of discussion by medical specialists and moral and religious leaders which is so desirable and needful.

OUR ENGLISH CHRYSOSTOM.*

The purpose of Mr. Brown's book is to give some account both of Jeremy Taylor's life and times and of his more important works. His life was one full of interest. Born, or at least baptised, in 1613, he studied at Cambridge and was elected to a Junior Fellowship there in 1633. His eloquent preaching brought him before the notice of Laud, who, finding in

**The Ethics of Birth Control.* (Macmillans, 1925. Price 2/6 net.)
**Jeremy Taylor.* By W. J. Brown, B.D. (S.P.C.K. 6/- net.)

him a promising supporter, secured for him a Fellowship at All Souls, Oxford. A few years later he was given a country living at Uppingham, but, being forced to leave this in 1642, he became a Chaplain in the Royalist army. After the downfall of the Royalist cause, a quiet retreat in Wales enabled him to produce some of his finest works. At the Restoration he was nominated to the Bishopric of Down and Connor, where he spent the rest of his days. His attachments, however, were not altogether happy or successful. Though he supported Laud, his own more liberal views occasionally brought suspicion on him, and after Laud's execution he was left with schemes but with little support. He was a strong loyalist, but after suffering mistrust and retreat during the Commonwealth he failed to obtain any adequate consideration under Charles II. He was a devoted Episcopalian; yet he found himself almost banished to Ireland to work in a See where sympathies were almost entirely Presbyterian. However, he lived a worthy life, contriving—as the writer well brings out—to blend loyalty to tradition with a love of free enquiry and a desire for orthodoxy with a contempt for narrow formalism.

Mr. Brown has given us a useful and interesting account of the more important of Taylor's works, and his study should help students of the originals to read them with a better sense of proportion. Many of these works are not as well-known as they deserve to be, seeing that Taylor was an accomplished writer with a style characterised by wealth of imagery and illustration. He devoted much of his time to Moral Theology. *Holy Living* and *Holy Dying*, of course, may be classed under this head, but other less well-known books played a great part in his day. In *Unum Necessarium* he examined the principles of repentance and their practical bearing on life and showed himself as anxious to expose false theories of sin and forgiveness as he was to teach men the necessity of repentance. His *Ductor Dubitantium* deals with 'cases of conscience,' and it is in this work of 'massive erudition' that he best shows the peculiar scholastic bend of his mind.

One of his most important works appeared in 1647, when the fact that the Independents had secured the person of the King allowed the hope that some measure of toleration might be accorded. *The Liberty of Prophesying* was a remarkable book, and, as Mr. Brown points out, 'it lays wide and deep the foundations of religious toleration, and its warnings and lessons have a special interest for the present age' (p. 59). Others had asked for toleration; Baxter had demanded 'unity in things necessary and liberty in things unnecessary, and charity in all,' and Milton was soon to plead that 'many be tolerated rather than all compelled'; but only a measure of comprehension was asked for, and Milton expressly repudiated 'Popery and open superstition.' Taylor, however, wished that toleration might be afforded all who were prepared to accept the Apostles' Creed: other things might have their value, but this alone was essential. And so he stands almost a solitary figure in his time pleading for 'Papists and Sacramentalists and Anabaptists.' His justification for this is well worth pointing out to-day: 'A good man that believes what, according to his light and upon the use of his moral industry, he thinks true, whether he hits upon the right or no, because he hath a mind desirous of truth, and prepared to believe every truth, is therefore acceptable to God, because nothing hindered him from it but what he could not help—his misery and weakness, which being imperfections merely natural, which God never punishes, he stands fair for a blessing of his morality, which God always accepts.'

We commend Mr. Brown's impartiality and on the whole we agree with the criticisms which he offers. Occasionally we have to differ. Despite Mr. Brown's criticism, for example, we agree with Taylor that 'no rational

man can think that any ceremony can make a spiritual change, without a spiritual act of him that is to be changed' (quot. p. 100). Taylor is speaking of the 'vanity of a late and sick-bed repentance' and is disapproving of the ceremony of unction. He compares the state of the dying man who has wasted his life's opportunities to that of the foolish virgins at the approach of the Bridegroom; no ritual act can remedy the mistake and 'unction of the dying man shall no more strengthen his soul than it cures his body.' Mr. Brown points out that this argument 'would lead to a disavowal of the efficacy of infant baptism'; but if we understand the word 'efficacy' aright, then we accept this disavowal and confess that it removes two evils—a magical view of Unction and a not less magical view of Baptism.

However, this is a welcome study of a great man. That Taylor was a man of genius will be admitted by all, even though he be denied the rank of a first-rate thinker. And if at times we cannot offer quite the same sympathy to his views as does Mr. Brown, yet we agree in admiring his earnestness and sincerity. Like Evelyn, he thought that 'all is vanity that is not honest and there is no solid wisdom but in real piety.' J.P.H.

CORRESPONDENCE

TRADITIONALIST AND MODERNIST.

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

In response to your challenge, for which I thank you, I willingly accept the title Traditionalist (in place of Orthodox); but let us notice that it is easily used in two senses, which must not be jumbled. (1) I have read several sentences in the *Modern Churchman* which imply nothing but disparagement—the term denoting an old fossil. (It is grudgingly admitted that there are some young fossils, but so few that they may be ignored.) (2) It may—nay, it ought to—mean one who eagerly welcomes new light, which, being shed on old truths, revivifies them and expands them mightily; but unless it falls on those old truths it does nothing; in fact it requires an Einstein to teach us that it falls anywhere else. So the Saviour announced Himself as a Traditionalist of an extreme type: this was in the sermon on the Mount (*Matt. V, passim*: and if anyone objects that the whole chapter is an interpolation, or a *Tendenz-schrift*, I must point out that the whole Gospel is traditionalist, and all our Lord's teaching too. Its sanity and its power are due to its method of starting always with the traditional convictions in men's minds.) Yet He was the boldest Modernist that ever shocked the slumbrous host of fossils; who, when they realised the pain of being awaked, crucified Him. But we must try to be both, as He was: we cannot understand the New Testament without the Old Testament.

The only other point I can deal with to-day is that of historical evidence. The term requires some scrutiny. Take the instance of the bodily Resurrection. It is evident, surely, that the two groups of enquirers begin with two discrepant presuppositions in their minds, and till the two are reconciled all discussion is not the tinkling of a cymbal but the beating of a tom-tom. Using initials, I would put it thus: To T. the evidence of the body having been raised a glorified body is complete. To M. it is quite unconvincing and he takes refuge in the idea of a 'spiritual resurrection.' To T. this idea is meaningless; the only thing conceivable, short of the biblical interpretation, is an ordinary spiritual *survival*—*e.g.* such as took

place in the case of Socrates and produced a very small effect. What, then, impels M. to it? I answer that it must be a sub-conscious conviction that God cannot, or anyhow does not, act on matter so as to disturb the uniformity of Nature. T.'s and M.'s alike have been powerfully impelled to this conviction by the triumphs of Science in the nineteenth century. '*Et in Arcadia ego.*' But Science herself has lately taught us the enormous (? illimitable) power of spirit over matter, which we are learning to think of as not violating any law, but as a perpetual manifestation of law on a higher plane. If M. catches a cricket ball he does not think of it as a violation of the law of gravitation, but as an intension of human volition into a series of mechanical sequences. Thus we men help to rescue the Universe from being construed as a dead machine. But if we can do it, and constantly *do* do it, what of the Creator? Hence our Lord told the Sadducees that their denial of the Resurrection showed they knew not the Scriptures, *neither the power of God.* This applies to all who conceive of God as something less than infinite. Does not M. also turn a deaf ear to Science herself, who tells us not to begin an enquiry by saying that anything is impossible?

If these two pre-suppositions are resolutely waived, we can consider the evidence profitably, having done our best to start with an *open mind.* Do you agree?

EDWARD LYTTELTON.

[We agree entirely with Dr. Lyttelton when he sees in our Lord's teaching both Traditionalist and Modernist elements. Like the scribe instructed unto the Kingdom of God He brought forth out of His treasures things new and old.

Dr. Lyttelton still maintains that Modernists do not believe alleged miracles, because they hold that miracles are impossible scientifically. That is not the Modernist's contention, although he recognizes that there are strong philosophical objections (sometimes mistaken for scientific objections) to the miraculous. What the Modernist contends is that the historical evidence is weak and conflicting. To-day the main issue is not the conflict between the Scientists and the Traditionalists, but the conflict between the Historians and the Traditionalists; and if Dr. Lyttelton will consult the Historians he will find that they do not start with the hypothesis that miracles are scientifically impossible. Until Dr. Lyttelton realises this he will find himself unable to understand the psychology of the Modernist. An example of this misunderstanding is seen in his comparing the Modernist view of the Resurrection of Jesus with the Greek view of the survival of Socrates. There is no historical evidence for Socrates manifesting himself after death to his friends: the evidence for Jesus manifesting Himself after His crucifixion to His disciples, and to St. Stephen, and to St. Paul, not only exists but is weighty. Nevertheless the Modernist contends that that evidence, when critically examined, does not entail belief in the resurrection of the physical body of Jesus.—ED., M.C.]

SONGS OF PRAISE.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE *Modern Churchman.*

SIR,

I trust the mass of Modernist clergy will not be content with the 'united plan of Modernist action' which Mr. Jennings suggests in regard to hymns. That plan amounts to nothing more than the suggestion that we avoid choosing untrue and bad hymns in our services, a course which I imagine all of us have adopted from the first moment any authority in the matter came into our hands. For years we have been lamenting the lack of a

Hymnal nearer our ideals than the existing popular collections. At last one is produced. Will it not be a more profitable plan of Modernist action for us to endeavour to get Songs of Praise widely adopted, and ourselves set the example?

The economic objection to this course is not so formidable an obstacle as it may appear at first sight. *Songs of Praise* is now published in three editions: Words and music, six shillings; words only (large type), half-a-crown; words only (small type), sixpence. Each edition is bound in cloth boards, and a twenty-five per cent. reduction off these prices is given as a grant by the Oxford University Press on all copies required for Church use, on the introduction of the book. I do not know what edition of *Hymns A. and M.* is now obtainable at twopence, but it cannot be a very strongly bound or attractive looking book; and I fancy the ultimate economy might not be to the disadvantage of *Songs of Praise*. Of course, the introduction will cost something, and something considerable; but if this matter of hymns is of the paramount importance we have been maintaining for years and years, we should not find the raising of ways and means an insuperable obstacle. The allotment of money spent in connection with churches is often ill-proportioned. We have introduced *Songs of Praise* for Church, Sunday School and Children's Church alike. It cost a fair sum. But it was not more than we gave for a single Sanctuary Lamp, and far less than we spent on Altar curtains and frontals during a year of renewals. Those Modernist clergy who have tried to teach their people, who have openly circulated our literature and so forth, should not find the introduction of a new Hymnal beyond their powers, if they explain once more to their people why the alteration is so essential.

There are, moreover, two vital considerations Mr. Jennings' plan ignores. We need to get rid of bad hymns, but we need still more to replace them by good ones. We also need, as Canon Hunter points out in his article on 'Music in Worship,' to get rid of bad tunes and replace them by good ones: and these two things can only be done by the adoption of a new Hymnal. Those who have tested the music of *Songs of Praise* will be in no doubt as to the vast improvement it effects in this direction.

Might I also, since I have mentioned teaching, add my word of praise to your review of Dr. Dearmer's '*Lessons on the Way*'? They are the finest Lesson Books I have come across, after a good deal of hunting, and it is to be hoped that all of us in a position to do so will help to make them better known.

CHARLES JENKINSON.

St. Paul's, Barking, Essex.
February 18th, 1926.

ST. LUKE'S SECOND SOURCE AND THE NARRATIVE OF THE LAST SUPPER.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE *Modern Churchman*.

SIR,

The great value of the theory of a proto-Luke, so lucidly explained by Mr. Buckley in your February number, may be illustrated by the Lukan narrative of the Institution of the Sacrament. The *Textus Receptus* presents the well-known crux of (apparently) two cups. But a careful reading suggests that in Luke xxii, 15-20, the Institution is completely related twice over, once in verses 15-18, and again in 19, 20. The breaking of the bread in the first account is implied in the reference to eating in verses 15 and 16. The actions with the bread and with the cup each conclude with a

reference to the Kingdom of God. Verses 15 and 16 are exactly paralleled by 17 and 18, and the whole passage is rounded off. That is to say, verses 15 to 18 give a complete account of the Last Supper. In this account the significance of the act is *eschatological* only. An examination of the synoptic tradition seems to show this passage to be largely (possibly entirely) non-Marcan. In other words, it is proto-Lk. Then the account in *Lk.* xxii, 19, 20, will be seen to correspond to that in 1 *Cor.* xi, 23-25. It is not entirely independent of the synoptic tradition, but its immediate source is plainly St. Paul. Reference to Rushbrooke should be sufficient evidence. The significance of the act here is *ritual.*

If this argument holds we have two Lukan narratives side by side. The Old Latin and Syriac variants are then easily explained as awkward attempts to reduce the doublet by cooking the text, and their evidence is evidence only of the early recognition of the difficulty of the Lukan tradition. This view leaves the *Textus Receptus* undisturbed and admits the Lukan authorship of the whole passage.

We have thus three separate and perhaps unrelated traditions of the meaning of the Supper: (1) proto-Lk. that it was an act of *eschatological* import, the meaning of which has escaped, unless the Pauline 'until he come' interprets it correctly; (2) Mk.-Matt., in which the predominant thought is *the sealing of a new covenant;* (3) St. Paul's, *the establishment of a ritual act;* while (4) Lk. reproduces all three elements but fails to co-ordinate them. He reproduces the Mk.-Matt. idea of a covenant only in the Pauline source, from which we might infer that Lk. only accepted Mk. as equal to proto-Lk. when the former was reinforced by Pauline authority, and even then he clung to the other (can we say earlier?) source. The eschatological element which would seem to be a feature of proto-Lk. is not itself a mark of date; but the respect with which St. Luke uses this source might justify the inference that he regarded its authority as not less and perhaps greater than Mk.'s. May we not do the same?

E. F. Martin.

St. John's Vicarage, Rastrick.

A CORRECTION.

To the Editor of the *Modern Churchman.*

Sir,

In the interests of accuracy I hope you will publish the correct translation and text of Goethe's lines cited on pp. 282, 283 of the *Modern Churchman.*

'Righeousness' expresses Dean Inge's way of looking at things as it does my own, but it is very different from 'loveliness,' which is characteristic of Goethe's philosophy.

Rustica Veritas.

As all Nature's thousand changes	Wie Natur im Vielgebilde
But one changeless God proclaim;	Einen Gott nur offenbart,
So in Art's wide kingdom ranges	So im weiten Kunstgebilde
One sole meaning still the same:	Webt ein Sinn der ew'gen Art;
This is Truth, eternal Reason,	Dieses ist der Sinn der Wahrheit,
Which from Beauty takes its dress,	Der sich nur mit Schönem schmückt
And serene through time and season	Und getrost der höchsten Klarheit
Stands for aye in loveliness.	Hellsten Tags entgegenblickt.

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